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Note for the Reader (abbreviations, translations and conventions) 
 
All abbreviations to ancient texts in footnotes follow the Oxford Classical Dictionary, with 
the exception of the Hippocratic texts, which follow the abbreviations in E. M. Craik’s The 
Hippocratic Corpus: Content and Context (London, 2015: v-viii). 
 
Ancient sources are cited by the name of the author, followed by the title of the work and 
line numbers/section where appropriate. The individual texts and translations used can be 
found in the Βibliography, under ‘Primary Texts and Translations’. 
 
All translations of the Hippocratic texts come from the Loeb Classical Library (LCL), unless 
otherwise stated, followed by the last name of the translator and page number(s) of the LCL 
volume consulted in square brackets, e.g. [Smith, 168-169]. Full bibliographic details of the 
LCL vols. consulted appear in the Bibliography. 
 
When quoting from the ancient texts, I have maintained the Greek original of some key terms 
and phrases. However, I have transliterated technical terms used frequently in my discussion 
e.g. ‘φαντασία’ = ‘phantasia’. 
 
Abbreviated titles employed in references and bibliography: 
 
DSM V Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 5th ed. (2013) 
American Psychiatric Association. American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Arlington. 
LCL Loeb Classical Library 
LS The Hellenistic Philosophers (1987) 2 Vols. Long, A. A. & Sedley, D.N. 
(eds.) Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.  
SVF Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (1903-1905), 3 Vols. Von Arnim, J. (ed.) 
Teubner. Leipzig 
 
 
   
6 
 
 
 
   
7 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation will examine accounts of visual hallucination from the Classical and 
Hellenistic periods from a variety of perspectives to consider the relationship between visual 
misperceptions and madness.1 To achieve this I adopt a thematic approach, drawing upon a 
range of primary textual sources – medical, philosophical and tragic – which describe or 
discuss the topic. As we will see, the various theories put forth by the writers on hallucination 
also offer insight into ideas on the workings of the mind and body in these periods, which in 
turn, inform the writers’ understanding of why those experiencing madness may see things 
that others around them do not. 
 
Earlier Approaches to Madness  
The topic of madness in the Classical world has been approached from a variety of different 
perspectives, and the bibliography is extensive.2 I consider here a selection of the most 
influential studies which have contributed greatly to our understanding of madness in 
antiquity and those which have informed my approach.  
E. R. Dodds’ 1951 seminal work The Greeks and the Irrational remains hugely 
influential in legitimising the academic study of madness and is lauded for its culturally 
sensitive approach to the ‘irrational’ aspects of Greek culture. Of particular interest is his 
chapter on the ‘The Blessings of Madness’, which emphasises the important role madness 
held in Greek religious experience.3 This means we must consider that madness was 
sometimes viewed as a positive state, depending upon its context and manifestation. A 
roughly contemporary article by I. E. Drabkin (1955) entitled ‘Ancient Psychopathology’ 
sought to establish some general recommendations, which would contribute to developing 
the scientific study of madness in antiquity. Within the article Drabkin stresses the 
importance of identifying what constituted mental disease and how Graeco-Roman medicine 
explained, classified and sought to treat them.4 This is a recommendation that has been 
enthusiastically taken up in later scholarship, and much has been written on the canonical 
 
1 I intentionally adopt the term ‘madness’, aware of its ambiguity, to cover a range of experiences in 
antiquity encompassing mental illness, irrational behaviours, prophetic madness and inspired states. 
2 I recommend Thumiger’s (2017a) well-rounded bibliographic survey of the status quaestionis of the 
mind and mental health in the ancient world in her recent monograph on the subject.  
3 Dodds (1951: 64-101). 
4 Drabkin (1955: 224).  
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triad of psychic illness (mania, phrenitis and melancholy) and ancient ideas upon how mental 
well-being was created, maintained and destroyed.5 
Other scholars have approached madness from a literary point of view;6 most 
relevant to my approach is R. Padel’s work on Greek tragedy, which explores Greek tragic 
notions of the mind and self (1992) and the vocabulary and imagery of tragic madness, with 
a focus on divine causation (1995). Both studies offer examples and analysis of metaphorical 
expressions of madness, supported by more technical sources, which are in my opinion, 
unsurpassed in their perceptiveness.7 I also adopt the idea that fictional sources reflect and 
contribute to the conceptualisation of ideas such as madness in the cultural milieu for which 
they were created. 
Finally, a recent collection of papers edited by V. W. Harris (2013c) in a volume 
entitled Mental Disorders in the Classical World is another important contribution in terms 
of its scope and the wide range of theoretical approaches it employs. The amalgamation of 
medical, philosophical and literary sources examined provides a far-reaching overview of 
madness in the ancient world by making use of source material from different areas of 
knowledge and performance. This approach has greatly influenced my methodology, which 
also incorporates a range of literary evidence in an attempt to reconstruct an understanding 
of hallucination in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. 
 
Studying Hallucination 
Studies of hallucination as a symptom of madness in antiquity, in contrast to studies of 
madness more generally, are few and far between. This lack of scholarly attention is perhaps 
surprising given that references to madness causing perceptual disturbances (illusion, 
hallucination, delirium and derangement) are certainly not absent from the ancient sources.  
One reason for the apparent paucity of studies is perhaps linguistic, given that no 
cognate exists in ancient Greek. The term ‘hallucination’ is derived from the Latin word 
[h]alucinari, to wander in mind, and first appeared in a translation of a work by Swiss 
 
5 For instance, McDonald (2009) on phrenitis; Pigeaud (1987) on mania; see Jouanna (2012: 229-258) 
on melancholy in ancient Greek medicine, and van der Eijk (2005:139-168) for philosophical 
approaches to melancholy. See also, Temkin’s (1971: 3-27) history of epilepsy which addresses the 
‘sacred disease’. On madness in philosophical writing see, Ahonen (2014). 
6 See O’Brien-Moore (1924), which despite its age, is perhaps the most comprehensive account of 
‘elevated representations of madness’ (p.7) in literature and Hershkowitz (1998) on madness in epic. 
7 For further discussion of Padel’s contribution, see Gill (1996). 
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theologian Ludwig Lavater in 1572.8 Although this may pose some difficulties in identifying 
hallucinatory experiences in the ancient texts, I do not believe that this causes an 
insurmountable problem. There seems to be no doubt that the phenomena, as we understand 
it now, certainly existed in antiquity. As Harris asserts, ‘[t]he Greek vocabulary of 
hallucinatory experiences is characteristically rich, especially in the matter of things seen…’. 
9 We will encounter various terms to describe the phenomenon in the course of this study, 
which will support this view. 
For the purposes of identifying what we should interpret as a hallucination in ancient 
testimonies I follow the current standard definition of hallucination as set out in the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: ‘Hallucinations are 
perception-like experiences that occur without an external stimulus.’10 It goes without saying 
that we cannot presuppose that ancient ideas which seem to indicate hallucinatory 
experiences are exactly the same as ours. I merely adopt this definition to impose some clear 
parameters of what will be included in this study and to mitigate any problems with 
vocabulary. In summary, I will include accounts or descriptions where an individual 
perceives something that others around them do not and for which no obvious physical object 
of perception exists. With this established, it will be useful now to discuss the main 
contributions to the study of hallucination in the Classical and Hellenistic world to date.  
 
Earlier Approaches to Hallucination 
In 1983 Jackie Pigeaud became the first to explore the issue of hallucination in any detail, 
with a particular focus on Stoic, Skeptic and Epicurean philosophy. Pigeaud’s analysis 
identifies that distinguishing between illusion and hallucination was a key concern in ancient 
philosophical writings.11 The words included in the title of the study ‘Voir, imaginer, rêver, 
être fou…’ succinctly capture the other strand of Pigeaud’s argument: that visions (illusions 
and hallucination), imagination, dreams and madness are all connected, which he explains 
via their relationship to phantasia.12 I will trace the development of this term, in relation to 
hallucination specifically, in my chapter on philosophical sources below.  
 
8 Sarbin & Juhasz (1967: 345) and La Barre (1975: 9). 
9  Harris (2013a: 288). 
10 DSM V (2013: 87). 
11 A distinction which is commonly attributed to the French nineteenth century psychiatrist Jean-Étienne 
Dominique Esquirol (Sarbin & Juhasz, 1967: 349).  
12 Pigeaud (1987: 23).  
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On the topic of auditory hallucinations, Leueder and Thomas (2000) looked at the 
various meanings which have been applied to hearing voices from the classical period to the 
present day. Two chapters address hearing voices in antiquity; the first, on the 
communication between men and gods in the Iliad and the second on Socrates’ daemon, 
which is reported as a disembodied voice that frequently spoke to him. The study focusses 
on the importance of the individual’s experience in understanding hallucinations, which they 
see as fundamentally connected to personality, life experience and cultural setting. It is 
notable that both the ancient hallucinatory experiences discussed in this study are 
conceptualised as communications with the supernatural world. Similarly, Giulio 
Guidorizzi’s (2010) Ai confine dell’anima: I Greci e la follia suggests that the appearance 
of gods to men in Homer gave poetic form to what was probably a common hallucinatory 
experience in pre-classical Greece.13 Unfortunately, I do not believe that this claim can be 
substantiated without further evidence but it is, nonetheless, thought-provoking, and may be 
supported by other studies, which have hypothesised that hallucinations of gods are more 
common in societies with high levels of religiosity.14 Guidorizzi’s overall approach has 
much in common with Dodds’ (1951) earlier approach to madness in the ancient world, 
particularly in its emphasis on Plato’s ambivalent feelings towards the topic and its 
celebration of the irrational in Greek culture.  
More recently, V. W. Harris approached the topic in a short study titled, ‘Greek and 
Roman Hallucinations’, which constitutes the most focused discussion on the topic to date, 
dealing with auditory and visual hallucinations from the fifth century to the age of 
Augustine.15 Its inclusion in a volume on mental disorders in the Classical world predicates 
hallucination as a recognised symptom of madness in antiquity and establishes the 
importance and wider ramifications of studying hallucinations to better understand aspects 
of mental illness.16 Harris’ chapter shows that the idea that hallucinations were attributable 
to divine forces pervades throughout these periods, but philosophical and medical writers 
were beginning to challenge this notion with explanations, which gave precedence to the 
role of the human body. The approaches he advocates in considering hallucination in 
 
13 Guidorizzi (2010: 149). 
14 See, for instance, Herman (2011: 144): ‘The content of visions, like dreams is culture[-]specific; 
people are culturally predisposed to behold certain visions more than others.’ 
15 Harris (2013a).  
16 Harris (2013b: 13): ‘It is a small step from specific syndromes to specific symptoms. If we want to gain 
an idea of how a wide range of Greeks and Romans regarded a particular class of symptoms of mental 
disorder, hallucinations are eminently worth investigating, all the more since, though they are not 
altogether easy to define, they were easier to recognize as symptoms than, say, mild delusions or mild 
behavioural disorders.’  
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antiquity (i.e. tracing connections and points of difference and considering variables such as 
religious versus secular understandings) are particularly helpful.  
Overall, existing studies of hallucination have tended to simply highlight the 
opposition between sacred and secular views of the phenomenon in the ancient sources, 
without examining in any detail the individual theories which led towards these 
understandings. An exception to this is perhaps Thumiger’s recent monograph (2017a) on A 
History of the Mind and Mental Health in Classical Greek Medical Thought, which pays 
close attention to the sensory aspects of mental illness in the Hippocratic texts, including 
misperception.17 Thumiger establishes that both hallucinations and dreams in Hippocratic 
contexts are ‘characterised as a seen image’, fundamentally linked to sight rather than a 
psychological phenomenon.18 However, she highlights that unlike dreams, ‘…hallucinations 
are always presented as a pathological, abnormal feature of mental life’.19 With this in mind 
then, theories of hallucination in antiquity are intrinsically bound up with theories of the 
senses, now a well-established area of study in the Classics.20 
The current scholarly discussions on modern philosophical theories of hallucination 
continue to raise fundamental questions about our understandings of epistemology, 
perception, human consciousness and our experience of reality. Increased philosophical 
interest in hallucination in recent years has also instigated fresh approaches to traditional 
understandings. New developments in this area, according to Macpherson and Platchias, 
have ‘…the potential to radically alter our approach and answers to traditional debates in 
philosophy concerning the nature of the mind, perception, and our knowledge of the 
world.’21 Despite scientific advances in today’s society, debates on how to account for the 
phenomenon are ongoing across various disciplines.22 Whilst I do not suggest to further 
current understandings of hallucinations, a complete answer for which continues to evade 
us, I do contend that studying the topic in antiquity adds to this discussion.23  
 
17 Thumiger (2017a) devotes an entire section to ‘Sensory Perception and its Impairment’ (275-334). On 
her discussion of ‘Visual Hallucination and Dreams’ specifically, see p.295-310. 
18 Thumiger (2017a: 296). 
19 Thumiger (2017a: 304). 
20 On vision (sight) specifically see, Squire (2015). On the senses in antiquity more generally, see Toner 
(2014). 
21 Macpherson & Platchias (2013: vii). 
22 See Macpherson (2013: 1-38) for an introduction to the current debates on hallucination in the fields of 
science, philosophy and psychology. 
23 Drabkin (1955: 223) also comments that the study of psychopathology in the ancient world goes beyond 
‘merely antiquarian interest’ and has the potential to ‘significantly deepen our understanding not only of 
ancient civilization but of our own.’ 
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Misperception and Madness 
Visual hallucinations are a phenomenon that have been associated with madness throughout 
human history.24 Perhaps the earliest reference to the long-standing association in Greek 
literature can be found in the Odyssey (Book 20, lines 345-360) in a scene that narrates the 
horrifying vision of the prophet Theoclymenus and the collective insanity of the suitors.25 
There are very few instances of madness in Homer26, however this rare example is worth 
brief consideration as it reflects some of the ideas about madness and hallucination that we 
will encounter in the later texts considered in this enquiry. The episode appears as follows: 
 
So spoke Telemachus, but among the suitors Pallas Athene    
aroused unquenchable laughter, and turned their wits awry.  
And now they laughed with lips that seemed not theirs,  
and all bedabbled with blood was the meat they ate, and their eyes  
were filled with tears, and in their own minds they seemed to be wailing.  
Then among them spoke godlike Theoclymenus: 
“Ah, wretched men, what evil is this that you suffer? Shrouded in night are 
your heads and your faces and your knees beneath you;  
kindled is the sound of wailing, bathed in tears are your cheeks,  
and sprinkled with blood are the walls and the fair panels.  
And full of ghosts is the porch, full also the court,  
ghosts hastening down to Erebus beneath the darkness,  
and the sun has perished out of heaven and an evil mist covers all.” 
So he spoke, but they all laughed merrily at him.  
And among them Eurymachus, son of Polybus, was the first to speak: 
“Mad is the stranger newly come from abroad.  
Quick, you youths, convey him out of doors  
to go to the assembly place, since here he finds it like night.” 
 
My particular interest in this passage is that it presents two distinct forms of madness, which 
are connected to abnormalities in perception. We can understand Theoclymenus’ vision as 
a hallucination as it seems that he is the only one in the crowded palace hall who sees it.27 
 
24 Whilst hallucinations can occur due to a variety of circumstances, in modern Western culture they are 
still frequently (rightly or wrongly) associated with those suffering from severe mental illness. The DSM 
V (2013: 102 & 166), for example, cites hallucinations as one of the main diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia and psychotic disorders. See also, Sarbin & Juhasz (1967) for the historical background of 
hallucination and its links to insanity. 
25 For an overall treatment of this passage see Rutherford (1992: 231-234). 
26 Saïd (2013: 363). My decision to focus on hallucinations in the Classical and Hellenistic periods is in 
part necessitated by this lack of literary evidence from earlier periods. 
27 See also Thumiger (2017a: 306-307) and Harris (2013a: 291), who justify this as a hallucinatory 
experience.  
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His vision is undoubtedly linked to his status as a prophet, as he portends accurately the 
bloody fate of the suitors, and he is experiencing what the Greeks would understand as a 
form of prophetic madness.28 The questions that this passage raises about perception and 
reality are extremely complex. The truthful visions of Theoclymenus, although 
hallucinatory, are presented as a privileged state of intensified perceptual awareness which 
allow him to access another world view.29 The suitors, on the other hand, are experiencing a 
case of divinely inflicted laughing madness, aroused by the goddess Athena, which means 
that they are unable to apprehend the veracity of Theoclymenus’ vision.30 They respond to 
the prophet’s vision with ridicule and, in a line dripping with irony, one of them concludes 
that the prophet’s visions mean that he must be suffering from madness.  
The portrayal of the suitors’ madness reflects the common idea in ancient Greek 
society that conflated mental derangement and aberrant states with godly interventions.31 
Guidorizzi describes that we ought to view their madness as form of collective delirium akin 
to an ‘ecstatic trance’.32 Most significantly for this enquiry, one effect that the suitors’ 
madness has is a visual detachment from reality, demonstrated by their unawareness that the 
meat they are consuming runs ominously with blood.33 Interestingly, the description of their 
madness, which manifests in a total loss of control (displayed by the suitors’  behaviour, 
which veers between uncontrolled laughter and tears), is an idea that will recur in later 
medical and philosophical discussions of hallucinatory madness.  
Thus, in this Homeric example we have two different forms of madness, which are 
connected to abnormalities in visual perception. One which allows truthful visions which 
no-one else can corroborate, and one which obscures and limits man’s capacity for visual 
comprehension. Thus, this passage establishes that seeing things that others could not was 
to be taken as a symptom of insanity, but also that madness could limit its subject’s capacity 
for vision comprehension.  
With this in mind, I will now establish the outline that this enquiry will take, which 
will show that the texts of the Classical and Hellenistic period, while they continue to 
 
28 See Hershkowitz (1998: 149-150 and 158-159). 
29 Thumiger (2017a: 306-307). Compare Plato’s discussion of divine madness in the Phdr. 244a-245c 
and Aeschylus’ Cassandra Ag. 1220-1254.  
30 For the significance of the suitor’s laughter as a sign of madness, see Halliwell (2008: 92-97). 
31 O’Brien Moore (1924: 11-15) on the Greek popular conception of madness as a form of possession or 
punishment.  
32 Guidorizzi (2001: 1). 
33 Furthermore the description of their head as shrouded in darkness may also allude to a degree of 
blindness. 
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encompass ideas of religious and prophetic madness evidence a shift towards more 
naturalistic portrayals and explanations.  
 
An Outline of the Present Enquiry 
In Chapter 1, I examine accounts of hallucination in medical texts to show that visual 
hallucinations were understood as a product of madness for which the medical authors 
propose several naturalistic accounts. I will present the differing aetiologies of hallucination 
offered, some of which are presumably accounts of real hallucinations recounted by patients 
and observed by physicians, rather than simply theoretical or hypothetical discussions.  
In Chapter 2, I turn to philosophical conceptions of hallucination, which are closely 
allied with medical discussions in antiquity, and which discuss at length theories of 
perception and why disturbances may occur. The philosophical discussions focus on the 
problems that misperceptions pose for an epistemic view of the senses, which I argue are 
largely attributed to madness and explained by the concept of phantasia.  
In Chapter 3, I turn to some of the most memorable figures associated with 
hallucinations in antiquity that come to us from literary sources. The tragedians frequently 
incorporated hallucinations into the madness of their characters and showed a sensitivity 
toward the implications on an individual level. Furthermore, the examination of tragedy has 
the advantage of considering how hallucinations were portrayed to a non-specialist audience, 
perhaps offering a glimpse into how madness was understood by the layperson.  
The overall aim is to bring together evidence which shows how the different writers 
explained the causes of hallucination and how this intersects with their understanding of 
madness. This will allow me to construct an idea of how hallucination as a symptom of 
madness was conceptualised in these periods. I conclude my enquiry with some general 
reflections upon the similarities which emerge from these discussions and upon the 
individual contributions of each source. Overall, the texts of the Classical and Hellenistic 
period express a shared proclivity for naturalistic explanations for hallucination, which 
consider physiology, psychology and the processes involved in visual perception. 
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Chapter 1 
Medical Accounts of Hallucination 
 
In this chapter, I will consider medical accounts of hallucination and their connection to 
madness. I concentrate this enquiry on the ‘Hippocratic’ texts, a large collection of medical 
works mostly belonging to the Classical period.34 Unfortunately, there is very little surviving 
evidence relevant to this discussion from the Hellenistic period, as the medical texts from 
this time only survive in fragments, none of which pertain to hallucination. For this reason I 
do include some reference to later authors who express opinions which may show influences 
from this period.35 
The texts I have established as most important for developing an understanding of 
how hallucinations were explained in medical contexts are: On the Sacred Disease; On 
Diseases of Girls; On Glands; On Places in Man; Internal Affections; and On Regimen. 
These texts each describe hallucination as a symptom of madness and provide various 
physiological explanations for the phenomenon. I organise my discussion around the various 
parts of the body connected to their production to illustrate the ways in which the medical 
authors sought to explain them. These various explanations are linked to the individual 
author’s understandings of madness and the effect it could have on their patient’s cognitive 
and sensory functioning. 
Overall, I argue that the various theories for hallucination in medical contexts are 
inextricably linked to ancient ideas of the effects of excess or noxious moistures in the body. 
As such, the various explanations for hallucination postulated in these sources are entirely 
reflective of the overall spirit of medical theory in this period, which sought rational accounts 
for all forms of illness and aberrancy, including madness and hallucination.  
 
1.1 The Hippocratic Corpus  
The Hippocratic corpus reflects at length on the nature of the human body and conditions 
that may cause disease.36 It is clear that this large collection is not the work of the historical 
physician Hippocrates of Cos alone, after which the collection is named, but attributable to 
a group of physicians working broadly in the Hippocratic tradition.37 As such, the texts 
 
34 For the dating of the individual texts, I rely mainly upon Craik (2015). 
35 See Nutton (2013: 142-159) for an overview of Hellenistic medicine and the issues of survival. 
36 For an overview of Hippocratic aetiology see, Hankinson (2018: 89-118). 
37 On the question of authorship see, Jouanna (1999: 56-71).  
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represent a variety of author’s opinions and theories, united by their rational approach to 
matters of health and disease.38  
The Hippocratic treatise The Sacred Disease is perhaps one of the earliest examples 
we have that captures the rationalising impulse of the Hippocratic writers, in contrast to 
earlier beliefs which tended towards the notion that disease was to be understood as a 
punishment from the gods, and which sought cure through their appeasement.39 The author 
challenges the idea that the so-called ‘sacred’ disease, generally recognised as epilepsy, 
ought to be viewed in these terms and proposes a rational account of its aetiology.40 The 
‘sacred’ disease, he describes, is particularly prevalent in those who are ‘phlegmatic’ in 
nature, which is hereditarily determined, and manifests when a build-up of this phlegm 
accumulates in the brain and blocks the flow of air around the body.41 This explanation 
introduces the predominant theory which emerges from the Corpus as a whole which 
ascribes illness to the imbalance of fluids or humours (χυμοί) thought to reside in the body.42 
It is held that the late fifth-century treatise The Nature of Man is the first to express the 
humoral theory of phlegm, black bile, yellow bile and blood that would prevail in later 
medical doctrine.43 The author of this late fifth-century work contends: ‘The body of man 
has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile, and through these he feels pain or 
enjoys health.’44 The author further relates these humours to the conditions of coldness, heat, 
moisture and dryness which can affect these constituents and engender disease.45 It should 
be stated that there is no overall consensus in the Hippocratic texts on the exact nature and 
number of these fluids, which is perhaps why in some texts we find the more generic 
description of moisture (ὑγρά) in the body causing disease.46 However, what is clear is that 
regardless of which humoral theory the individual Hippocratic author subscribed to, the 
 
38 It should be noted that the boundaries between medical and philosophical approaches in this period 
are not clearly defined; and the development of rational medicine was undoubtedly encouraged by the 
development of rational discourse in allied disciplines such as natural philosophy.  
39 See Longrigg (2013: 6-25) for an overview on Greek ‘irrational’ medicine. 
40 Morb. Sacr. 1 [Jones, 139-140]: ‘It is not, in my opinion, any more divine or more sacred than any 
other diseases, but has a natural cause, and its supposed divine origin is due to men’s inexperience, and 
to their wonder at its peculiar character’ 
41 Morb Sacr. 8-10 [Jones, 158-159]. I think it is worth noting that although this formulates a 
naturalistic account of illness, the author does not negate the role of the divine in human affairs entirely 
and still recognises that the gods have a hand in by bringing about environmental conditions that may 
precipitate the physiological reactions that lead to disease. See also, Aer. 22 [Jones, 155ff.], which 
expresses the same idea. 
42 Craik (2009: 110). 
43 On legacy of this treatise, see Jouanna (2012: 335-359). 
44 Nat. Hom. 4.1-3 [Jones, 11]. 
45 Nat. Hom. 2.18-20 [Jones, 7]. 
46 van der Eijk (2001: 48). 
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moistures of the body (which could be determined by a range of factors including lifestyle, 
diet, environment and natural constitution) were thought to play a fundamental role in both 
the maintenance and breakdown of human health. The differing opinions on the importance 
and character of the bodily fluids will be reflected in the various explanations for 
hallucinatory madness I address below.  
 
1.2 Hippocratic Approaches to Madness 
The Hippocratic writers’ rational approaches to human health also extend to their discussions 
on madness. Drabkin’s remarks on Greek psychopathology reveal that, ‘Greek medicine 
from first to last holds that obvious mental abnormality is a disease or else the symptom of 
a disease, and like any other disease or symptom requires a naturalistic explanation’.47 In 
other words, the texts we will encounter in this chapter do not demarcate mental from 
physical illness and as such various somatic explanations are offered. 
It is also generally understood that in early medical writing madness is not usually 
discussed in terms of distinct disorders; most of the descriptions of madness focus on 
identifying recognisable symptoms.48 This view is supported by the linguistic evidence 
which shows that terms related to mania are frequently employed by Hippocratic authors to 
discuss symptoms and cases of mental aberrancy without necessarily implying a clinical 
definition.49 The observable symptoms of madness in the Corpus include obvious loss of 
reason, alterations in a person’s normal behaviour, consideration of a patient’s emotional 
state, the speech and testimony of the patient and, of particular importance for this 
discussion, sensory disturbances such as hallucination.50 
Madness and its symptoms are most frequently attributed to the effect that 
imbalances in the body can have on the psychic functioning of the individual. It is probably 
for this reason that we find several disparate theories for hallucination, dependent upon 
where the physician fell within this debate. A number of competing theories for the location 
and functioning of the psychic faculties are recorded in the corpus including the brain, 
pneuma, the diaphragm, the blood, the heart and the soul (ψυχή),51 which I will now go on 
to discuss.  
 
47 Drabkin (1955: 224). 
48 Eidinow (2014: 485).  
49 For an excellent survey of the early Greek vocabulary of madness, see Thumiger (2013a: 61-95). 
50 Thumiger (2017b: 56). 
51 Jouanna (2012: 200). 
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1.3 Hallucination and the Body 
1.3.1 The Brain 
The idea that the brain is to be regarded as the source of mental activity is perhaps most 
clearly presented in The Sacred Disease, where the health of the brain is presented as a 
necessary precondition to normal sensory functioning and cognition. The passage in question 
is worth quoting in full for discussion: 
 
Men ought to know that from the brain, and from the brain only, arise our 
pleasures, joys, laughter and jests, as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs and 
tears. Through it, in particular, we think, see, hear, and distinguish the ugly 
from the beautiful, the bad from the good, the pleasant from the unpleasant, in 
some cases using custom as a test, in others perceiving them from their utility. 
It is the same thing which makes us mad or delirious (μαινόμεθα καὶ 
παραφρονέομεν), inspires us with dread and fear, whether by night or by day, 
brings sleeplessness, inopportune mistakes, aimless anxieties, absent-
mindedness, and acts that are contrary to habit. These things that we suffer all 
come from the brain, when it is not healthy, but becomes abnormally hot, cold, 
moist, or dry, or suffers any other unnatural affection to which it was not 
accustomed. Madness comes from its moistness. When the brain is abnormally 
moist (ὑγρότερος), of necessity it moves, and when it moves (κινεῖσθαι) neither 
sight nor hearing are still, but we see or hear now one thing and now another, 
and the tongue speaks in accordance with the things seen and heard on any 
occasion.52 
 
The brain is seen as responsible for various experiences and functions which we would 
describe as psychological (thinking and making judgements) and sensorial (seeing and 
hearing) in nature. However, the writer asserts that if the brain is abnormally affected by the 
hot, cold, wet and dry qualities of the body, or any other affection to which it is not 
accustomed, a variety of adverse psychological responses can manifest including feelings of 
dread, fear, anxiety, absent-mindedness, abnormal behaviour, delirium and madness. 
According to this author madness is attributed to moistness caused by a flux of either heated 
bile or phlegm, which reaches the brain via the blood vessels.53 The author specifies that, 
depending upon whether phlegm or bile is the instigator, different types of madness 
manifest, with a hyperactive madness on the one hand and a depressive and withdrawn 
 
52 Morb. Sacr. 18 [Jones, 175ff.]. 
53 Morb. Sacr. 18. 9-13 [Jones, 177].  
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madness on the other.54 This text explains various types of madness by drawing upon the 
fundamental idea in ancient medicine that different forms and amounts of ‘moisture’ can 
cause different illnesses.  
The significance of this text in terms of hallucination is that it postulates that 
moistness can precipitate a movement in the brain which can agitate both sight and hearing; 
the sufferer is described as speaking of ‘things seen or heard on any occasion’. It is not 
explicit what exactly the author implies here, and sadly it is not clarified elsewhere in this 
text. However, we are told that the agitation of sight can cause the person to vocalise a 
recollection of events which is no longer concurrent with their present surroundings, strongly 
suggesting a hallucinatory experience.  
The issue is complicated by the fact that in some medical contexts speech itself was 
considered a sensory capacity. In Regimen I the senses are linked to the seven ‘figures’ (or 
vowels) in a discussion which relates various crafts, in this case writing, to the nature of the 
body.55  If this is the case then the author may simply be adding the symptom of confused 
speech to his list of sensory aberrances caused by the moistness of madness, without 
necessarily implying a connection to vision. However, there are a few reasons why I believe 
that this can be interpreted as a visual hallucination.56  
Firstly, the fact that the vocalisation of the maddened individual is said to describe 
‘things seen and heard’, I believe, relates this to a sensory experience, rather than simply 
describing rambling or incoherent speech. Secondly, we find evidence elsewhere in the 
Corpus (in fifth-century treatise On the Diseases of Girls) which explicitly refers to the 
‘sacred disease’ causing people to ‘think they see’ something which does not exist, which in 
this case is fundamentally connected to sight (ὄψιος).57 Finally, the event described is related 
to the conditions of ‘dread and fear’, which also indicates that this could denote a 
hallucinatory experience, as these emotions are described in other works which involve 
instances of misperception.58 Overall, this implies that the moistness of madness may affect 
 
54 On this binary classification of madness in ancient medicine and philosophy see Jouanna (2013: 97-
118).  
55 Vict. 1. XII-XXIV [Jones, 251ff]. 
56 That the composition of Vict. 1 is decidedly later also calls this into question, see Craik (2015: 275). 
57 Virg. [Potter, 359]. 
58 ibid. Moreover, although a different aetiology is offered, those who exhibit loss of reason and do not 
perceive the world rationally are also described as fearing ‘what is not dreadful’ in Vict. 1.35 [Jones, 
281ff.]; in this treatise different forms of perceptual activity are ascribed to the soul’s unique blend of 
fire and water. 
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the brain in such a way that the maddened individual sees and hears things which others do 
not.  
A final point of interest is that the Sacred Disease also states that the psychological 
symptoms of the illness can occur during both night and day which, on the basis that dreams 
(visons whilst asleep) and hallucination (visions whilst awake) were considered 
homogeneous in this period, also strongly suggest a hallucinatory quality.59 The importance 
of dreams as a diagnostic tool and as a way of understanding the state of the body is a 
common Hippocratic idea, most clearly expressed in Regimen IV.60 It was thought that the 
content of dreams could provide important signs to the Hippocratic doctor. For instance, if 
the dreamer reports, ‘Crossing rivers, enemy men-at-arms and strange monsters’ this was 
viewed as a sign of disease or indeed madness (μανίην).61 Incubation rituals associated with 
the god Asclepius also used dreams as the primary way of diagnosing and proposing 
treatment.62 Perhaps surprisingly, I have not found any evidence in the sources that indicate 
that the content of hallucinations was utilised as a diagnostic tool in quite the same way. 
What is notable is that dreams, when discussed as a feature of madness, tend to be described 
as more intense and frightening (monsters, ghosts, malevolent spirits), which seems 
consistent with the descriptions above, relating fear to madness in waking contexts.63 
However, the analysis of the form and content of hallucinations, mundane or otherwise, does 
not seem to have been an issue of importance in medical contexts in quite the same way that 
dreams appear to have been. 
Another account of hallucination that is complimentary to the theory put forth by the 
Sacred Disease is the treatise On Glands. Some scholars propose that this treatise may 
belong to the Hellenistic period, perhaps offering us a rare account of hallucination from this 
era.64 Again, an opinion is expressed that a flux of fluid to the brain, here conceptualised as 
a gland, may induce hallucinations. According to this text the overall function of the glands 
is to regulate the moisture of the body; for this reason, glands are most prominent in parts of 
the body that are high in moisture (the areas around the kidneys and intestines are cited as 
 
59 See also Virg. 1.9-10 [Potter, 359] ‘people think they see malevolent spirits, sometimes by night, 
sometimes by day, and sometimes at both hours.’ On the homogeneity of dreams and hallucinations in 
Hippocratic sources, see Thumiger (2017a: 304-306).  
60 See also Hum. IV.15-16 [Jones, 69]. On diagnostic dreams in Hippocratic medicine see Holowchak 
(2002: 129-138). 
61 Vict. 4.93.30-35 [Jones, 447]. 
62 Temkin (1971: 14). 
63 ‘The dreams of patients with phrenitis are vivid’, Prorrh. 1.5 [Potter, 171]. 
64 Jouanna (1999: 393). 
   
21 
examples).65 The brain itself is described as functioning in this way: ‘For whatever moisture 
occupies the head in the manner I have described, the brain helps by drawing off, and it sends 
away to the extremities most of what arises from fluxes.’66 However, if this fails the brain can 
become inflamed by the moisture, provoking diseases that are described as more severe than 
those found in other glands.67  
A movement similar to that described in the Sacred Disease is discussed, in which the 
brain moves and convulses the person, when subjected to a sharp flux of moisture, causing 
impairment of the mind, delirium and even apoplexy.68 In other cases, the flux of moisture is 
less sharp (δριμύ) but greater in quantity, and in these instance the flux affects the patient’s 
reasoning abilities and  sensory experience of the world: ‘…the reason (φρονῶν) is disturbed 
and the victim goes about thinking and seeing alien things; one bears this kind of disease 
with grinning laughter and grotesque visions (φαντάσμασιν)’.69 The associations between 
madness and laughter expressed here have a long history in Greek culture.70  One could think, 
for instance, of the suitor’s maniacal laughter in the Odyssey, discussed in my introduction.71 
We also find instances of laughter as a sign of feverish delirium elsewhere in the Hippocratic 
texts; a patient named Silenus in one of the Epidemics’ case studies is described as suffering 
from acute fever which has driven him ‘out of his mind’ and he is described as exhibiting 
‘much rambling, laughter, singing; [and] no power of restraining himself.’72 On Glands, 
therefore, constitutes another example that connects disturbances, caused by moisture in the 
brain, with hallucinations and symptoms associated with madness.  
 
1.3.2 The Eyes 
Other accounts consider the eye itself in the formation of veridical and non-veridical images. 
The fifth-century Hippocratic treatise Places in Man articulates a theory of the sensory 
capacities, which outlines how sensory data is received by the brain. The text postulates that 
vision is made possible by a form of ‘purest’ moisture within the brain which is delivered to 
the eyes through a series of narrow vessels.73 The author conceives that there is a link 
 
65 Gland. 5-6 [Potter, 111]. 
66 Gland. 10. [Potter, 115]. 
67 Gland. 10-11. [Potter, 115-117]. 
68 ibid. 
69 Gland. 12, [Potter, 119]. 
70 See Halliwell (2008: 16-17) on the dichotomy of laughter as both a sign of health and as a symptom 
of madness in Greek culture.  
71 Quoted on p. 12. 
72 Epid, 1. case 2 [Jones, 189].  
73 Craik (1998: 105) identifies this may be an early reference to the optic nerves. 
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between the brain’s moisture and the formation of images in the eyes, as without this 
moisture the eyes would be incapable of seeing.74 Furthermore, the author contends that if 
anything other than this purest moisture reaches the eye, disturbances may occur, 
 
The pupil is nourished by moisture from the brain; if it takes up anything from 
the vessels, it is disturbed by this afflux, and the image does not appear normally 
in it, but something seems to dance before it, sometimes like the image of birds 
and sometimes like black specks, and otherwise it is not able to see anything 
clearly according to reality.75 
 
That the eye is described as receiving an image that does not appear normally implies that a 
real object of perception does exist which is simply misinterpreted, suggesting an illusion 
rather than a hallucination. However, it is interesting to consider that we now recognise that 
hallucinations can vary greatly in intensity, from simple patterns and dots to complex scenes 
and forms, which means what is described may denote a hallucination by modern 
standards.76 Although the eye is considered here, it is still ultimately the brain that is viewed 
as responsible for supplying the eye with a particular form of moisture. This idea is therefore 
complimentary to the first explanations for hallucination I examined, as it indicates that the 
health and correct functioning of the brain is necessary for reliable perception. That this 
description of sensory disturbance is not directly linked to madness suggests that the non-
veridical visions connected to madness tend to be more spectacular in nature. 
Galen rearticulates the idea that the eye itself is linked to the formation of 
nonveridical vision in the second century AD. In On Diseases and Symptoms he discusses a 
thin fluid in the eyes, which he terms the ‘aqueous humour’ that seems to be consistent with 
the ‘purest moisture’ described in the Hippocratic example. He elaborates that this can cause 
a condensation of sorts in a chamber of the eye which obstructs the cornea giving rise to 
false visions.77 We can expect that Galen’s knowledge of the eye’s physiology was assisted 
by the Hellenistic advancements in understanding the human body through dissection.78  
 
 
 
74 Loc. Hom. 2-3 [Potter, 23-27]. 
75 Loc. Hom. 3 [Potter, 25]. 
76 Sacks (2012: 35-36). 
77 Caus. Symp I, II.9 [Johnston, 212]. 
78 Hankinson (1991: 208).  
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1.3.3 The Heart and Diaphragm 
Let us return to the aforementioned treatise On Diseases of Girls to examine a different 
physiological explanation for hallucinatory madness linked to the heart and diaphragm. This 
short treatise describes a disease which is said to affect young girls during a certain stage of 
puberty (before menarche) which subsides when the girl menstruates or becomes pregnant.79  
The author describes that the illness begins with numbness and lethargy, followed by a 
wandering fever which progresses towards madness, frightening hallucinations and 
sometimes suicide. The author’s acknowledgement that experiencing such visions could lead 
to suicide indicates an understanding that hallucinatory experiences could be extremely 
traumatic and have a severe psychological impact.  
In this account it is the bad state of the blood that is said to affect the mind (θυμός), 
which according to this author is placed in the region of the diaphragm and heart in contrast 
to the theories above, which placed the psychic faculties in the brain.80 The fourth-century 
BC physicians Praxagoras and Diocles of Carystus are also reported to have connected the 
effects of blood and bile on the heart with madness, showing that this text is not anomalous 
in this regard.81  
The Hippocratic author explains that the illness occurs when menstrual blood 
becomes trapped in the womb; the blood, having nowhere to go is forced towards the heart 
and the diaphragm, which causes ‘derangement and raging’. It is specified that the deranged 
girl alone sees the ‘hostile spirits’ described, establishing this as a hallucination. The effects 
of blood on the region of the heart and diaphragm cause the female to describe, ‘strange and 
frightful things, which urge (κελεύουσιν) the women to take a leap and to throw themselves 
down wells, or to hang themselves’.82 The use of κελεύουσιν indicates that these strange and 
fearful things communicate with the sufferer, meaning that this could represent both an 
auditory and visual hallucination; towards the end of this treatise a single term to denote 
these visions is used, i.e. φαντασμάτων, establishing the experience as linked to the 
formation of visual images.  
The identification of the diaphragm as the locus of the mind and of madness is 
complemented by the Hippocratic author of Internal Affections, which gives a long and 
detailed account of diseases known to the author grouped according to where they originate 
 
79 King (2002: 78-79). 
80 Virg. [Potter, 359-363]. 
81 Anon. Par. Fr. 72; 74 [van der Eijk, 143 and 147]. 
82 Virg. [Potter, 361]. 
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in the body.83 The passage in question is framed within a discussion of so-called ‘Thick 
([π]αχέα) diseases’,84 one of which is attributed to an excess of bile as it causes the liver to 
swell and press against the diaphragm. In such cases, the physician observes both diminished 
sight and hearing and the patient is described as plucking wool from his bedclothes, thinking 
that they are lice.85 As the illness progresses, and the liver continues to expand against the 
diaphragm, visual hallucinations manifest, 
 
When his liver expands even more against the diaphragm, the patient becomes 
deranged; there seem to appear before his eye reptiles and every other sort of 
beasts, and fighting soldiers, he imagines himself to be fighting among them; 
he speaks out as if he is seeing such things, and he attacks and threatens … 
when he goes to bed, he starts up out of his sleep on seeing fearful dreams…86 
 
This illustrates that as the swelling increases, so do the intensity of the patient’s symptoms 
of sensory aberrancy; from mistaking wool for lice (an illusion perhaps, but terrifying 
nonetheless), towards seeming to see figures, animals, monsters and complex scenes.87 The 
patient’s reaction to these visions indicates an unawareness that his perceptions are 
hallucinations, as he is described as responding physically and verbally to them as if they 
are a reality. The later suggestion by the physician that this disease usually happens if a 
person is abroad and travelling a lonely road is interesting and could indicate that sensory 
deprivation was understood to be a contributor to sensory disturbances88 or, that the disease 
is triggered by environmental factors to which the individual is unaccustomed, which could 
upset the internal balance of the body.89 
The plucking described in the passage above may relate to the symptoms of 
karphologia and krokydismos, most commonly associated with another acute and often 
deadly disease, phrenitis. 90 This illness takes its name from the part of the body thought to 
cause the illness, the phrēn. From as early as Homer the phrēn was conceptualised as the 
 
83 Unfortunately, what is lacking from the text is an account of affections which originate in the head. 
Craik (2015: 136) comments that the text which begins with the lungs and works downwards may 
indicate that this treatise has not survived intact.  
84 Int. 47-50 [Potter, 197-211]. 
85 This symptom may be indicative of phrenitis, which I address below.  
86 Int. 48 [Potter, 201-207]. 
87 Note that again we see the recurring trend that hallucinations and dreams are treated together. 
88 See similarly, Thumiger (2017a: 305) and Sacks (2012: 34). 
89 See, n. 41 above. 
90 The Greek terms refer to the plucking at straw or specks on the wall and the plucking of wool and 
threads from bedding respectively, see Ahonen (2014: 23). 
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part of the human body responsible for rational thinking and seems to have been situated in 
the chest.91 In Hippocratic texts however, phrenitis is more readily understood as an 
inflammation of the diaphragm, which could also affect the mind.92 Others, such as Diocles 
and Praxagoras, contended that phrenitis was an inflammation in the heart, reflecting their 
stance that intelligence resides in this organ.93 This establishes another illness which may 
produce a hallucination as a symptom, again linked to the diaphragmatic region of the body 
(the abdomen, chest and heart).    
It should perhaps be noted that in the Classical period phrenitis was not necessarily 
classified as a form of madness;94 it is only in later medical doctrine that phrenitis is accepted 
into the official canon of madness.95 On Disease 1.30 is the only example I have found in 
the corpus that directly equates the symptoms of phrenitis with madness (μαίνονται) which 
is attributed to the effects of bile in the blood which heats up the body.96 Interestingly, this 
Hippocratic author draws a comparison with the madness of melancholy, stating that 
phrenitis is caused by a similar process but occurs when the bile is less powerful. This 
suggests that this author may have viewed phrenitis as a diluted form of madness, or at least 
believed it shared some common characteristics.  
One of the rare first-hand accounts of phrenitis comes to us from later antiquity in a 
passage from Galen, who recounts his own experience of the illness, which included the 
characteristic symptoms of karphologia and krokydismos. Galen, due to his knowledge of 
pathology, was able to recognise the symptoms as a product of the illness and quickly 
realised that he was hallucinating.97 Interestingly, Galen also relates that his illness caused 
him to experience nightmares, again reinforcing the supposed connection between states of 
dreaming and hallucination. Furthermore, in the same account Galen ascribes phrenitis to 
either an inflammation of the brain or the diaphragm.98 The first could produce the 
characteristic symptom of plucking invisible objects and the latter more intense 
hallucinations.99 Thus, extreme cases of hallucinations as a result of phrenitis only come to 
 
91 McDonald (2009: 1, n.3). 
92 Ahonen, (2014: 23).  
93 See McDonald (2009) on the concept of phrenitis in Diocles (p.59-70) and Praxagoras (p.71-78). 
94 McDonald’s (2009: 32) analysis of phrenitis in the Hippocratic Corpus establishes that fever and 
delirium were the only consistent symptoms of the illness. However, the effects of the illness on the 
mind are attested, see for instance Epid. 7.112 [Smith, 383]: ‘παρέκρουσε τρόπον φρενιτικόν’. 
95 Harris (2013b: 8) notes that Celsus is the first to discuss this tripartite classification of madness in any 
detail but acknowledges that this may be indebted to Hellenistic doctors.  
96 Morb 1.30 [Potter, 159], this treatise views blood as the source of intelligence.  
97 De Loc Aff. 4.2 (Siegel, 108). 
98 For a discussion of Galen’s views on phrenitis see, Ahonen (2014: 156-158). 
99 ibid. 
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us from later authors, writing at a time when phrenitis has become a classified form of 
madness. Galen’s attribution of more intense hallucinations to the diaphragm, rather than the 
effects of bile on the brain, seems consistent with the Hippocratic evidence; the Hippocratic 
explanations for hallucination that centre on this region appear to me to be much more 
descriptive and dramatic in nature than those described elsewhere. 
The accounts of hallucination covered in this section, although offering different 
physiological explanations, are still congruent with the overall Hippocratic view that the 
pathology of diseases was connected to imbalances of the body’s moistures. In the first 
example, hallucinations arise when an excess of menstrual blood creates pressure around the 
heart and diaphragm where, in this text, the mind is situated. In the second, hallucinations 
are ascribed to the swelling effects of black bile on the liver and diaphragm. In the third, 
phrenitis, which is conceptualised as an affection of the heart or diaphragm in our period of 
interest, can also produce misperceptions, but it seems only later to have been more directly 
linked to hallucination, when the condition becomes a classified from of madness. 
 
1.3.4 The Soul 
Madness as a disease of the soul does not emerge clearly from the Hippocratic medical works 
in the same way as it does in philosophical writings, as we will see in the next chapter. 
However, the Hippocratic text On Regimen 1, relevant to the discussion of hallucination, 
does give the soul (ψυχή) considerable attention. 
Here, the soul is cast as the locus of emotion, intelligence, and sensation and was 
viewed as a composite blend of fire (hot and dry) and water (cold and moist) of which six 
variations are described.100 According to the amount of fire and water, the author outlines a 
theory in which a person’s intelligence and sensitivity to perceptual stimuli is determined. 
These descriptions are interesting as they equate both extremes in the constitution of the soul 
with hallucination and different forms of madness. Those with more water than fire exhibit 
a dullness in their senses, as it is understood to slow down the capacities of the soul. At the 
extreme end of this scale, the dominance of water over fire is said to cause a ‘senseless’ 
madness characterised by irrational fears and sadness. The author describes the sensory 
experiences of these individuals as meaning that ‘their sensations are really not at all those 
 
100 Vict. 1.35 [Jones, 281ff.]. 
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that sensible persons should feel.’101 The suggestion that these people are irrational does 
point towards a loss of reason, which is indicative of madness.102 
On the other hand, if the individual is dominated by fire the soul is quicker, which 
although more rapidly able to receive sensations, also ‘more rapidly passes judgement on 
the things presented to it, and on account of its speed rushes onto too many objects’.103 If 
this imbalance is not addressed through regimen (consuming more water and fish, abstinence 
from sex and vomiting are all suggested) then the blood of the person can become inflamed, 
leading to madness. These fiery souls are also described as experiencing dream visions and 
as ‘half-mad’ (ὑπομαινομένους) by the author. A person with this constitution, according to 
Jouanna’s analysis of this treatise, is distinguishable by their state of, ‘excited madness 
characterized by hallucinations.’104 This text, therefore, shows another theory for 
hallucination related to an imbalance within the body, in this case conceptualised as a 
disequilibrium between water and fire, linked to the individual nature of the person’s soul.  
 
1.4 Concluding Remarks 
The examples I have discussed in this chapter have shown that hallucinations in medical 
sources are described as a symptom of several different disorders with a mental quality, 
generally ascribed to humoral imbalances in various parts of the body.  
In the first section, I established that one such view was that changes in the brain, 
linked to moisture, could produce hallucinatory symptoms associated with madness. 
Following the humoral theory of health and illness, the Sacred Disease and Glands attribute 
hallucination and madness to the effects of excess moisture on the brain. The moistness is 
described as producing an abnormal movement in the brain, which could give rise to visions 
which were not representative of reality.  
Secondly, I presented evidence that the moisture of the brain was also viewed as 
important to the formation of images in the eye, which could become subject to inaccurate 
visions if the brain was not in a state of optimal health. The idea that disruptions to the 
processes of vision may play a role in the production of hallucination is an idea that will be 
more fully explored in my following chapter on philosophical sources, where the discussions 
of hallucination focalise the issues that madness poses for perception.  
 
101 Vict 1.35. 80-85 [Jones, 287]. 
102 See Thumiger (2017a: 280) who interprets that the sensations are in opposition to those experienced 
by ‘sensible persons’ indicates insanity. 
103 Vict. 1.35.107-110 [Jones, 289]. 
104 Jouanna (2012: 201). 
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Thirdly, I looked at ideas which considered how the mind could be affected by 
pressure or inflammation in the region of the heart and diaphragm. In these cases, we find 
perhaps the most evocative descriptions of hallucination in the corpus, which emphasise the 
terrifying nature that a detachment from so-called reality and false perceptions can engender. 
Within this category of affections of the diaphragm I also considered phrenitis which became 
associated with specific hallucinatory symptoms (karphologia and krokydismos), 
particularly in later medical writings. 
Finally, I looked at the theory put forth by the Hippocratic text Regimen I, where the 
author presented two forms of madness linked to an excess of fire or water, both of which 
could produce hallucinations, which considered that the composition of the soul could 
impact on sensory experiences and the individual’s ability to make rational judgements. The 
idea that the soul is to be understood as the locus of perceptual experience will also resurface 
in the philosophical discussions of vision, which I address in the following chapter.  
We can see overall that medical writers sought to provide naturalistic explanations 
for the symptom of hallucinations, which they connected to varying degrees of mental 
disturbance, including madness. Although the Hippocratic texts offer some vivid 
descriptions of hallucinations, there is no clear consensus as to why or how they occurred.  
Hallucinations seem to be one of many indicators of madness for which the medical 
writers sought to provide naturalistic accounts. In this way, they sought to gain control over 
the chaos of madness by rationalising its origin, presenting it as physiological event and 
seeking regimen. The discussions of hallucinations as a symptom of madness are thus 
entirely complimentary to the overall approaches to health and illness in these periods, most 
readily attributed to the various mixtures of the body and their imbalance.  
With that in mind I now I turn to the philosophical conceptions of hallucination, 
which are closely allied with medical discussions in antiquity. However, as we will see, they 
also offer some novel reflections upon hallucinations, framed with debates upon perception, 
which consider why such visual disturbances may occur. 
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Chapter 2 
Philosophical Explanations for Visual Hallucination 
 
This chapter examines theories for hallucination in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy and 
considers their connection to madness. 
I begin by establishing that although philosophy recognises that madness could come 
from diseases of the body, as we saw in the previous chapter, they also develop an approach 
that considers madness as an ethical or moral flaw, understood as a disease of the soul. Both 
forms of madness, as we will see, could affect perception.  
Secondly, I outline some of the main philosophical theories for the faculty of sight 
from the Classical and Hellenistic periods. An understanding of how the philosophers 
explain the physical act of vision will be crucial to this enquiry. I will demonstrate how the 
different models articulated also inform understandings of hallucination.  
Thirdly, I discuss the connections between the processes of hallucination and dreaming 
in Plato and Aristotle, which they attribute to the faculty of phantasia. This will set the scene 
for my discussion of the concept of phantasia which holds a special place in the philosophy 
of perception in antiquity, and which the philosophers’ use to account for various 
misperceptions. 
Overall, I will show that philosophical approaches to hallucination connect visual 
hallucination with madness, but also that they consider madness as a more general condition, 
which means that true perception is not always possible for those who lack proper 
philosophical training, to allow correct judgements on the information received by the 
senses.  
 
2.1 Madness and Misperception 
The philosophers recognised madness as one of the conditions that could make perceptions 
fallible, due to its associations with loss of reason. The pseudo-Aristotelian text On Things 
Heard provides a particularly arresting example which recounts the tale of a man who, 
suffering from an unspecified madness, experiences complex and vivid hallucinations: ‘It is 
said that at Abydus a man who was mad went into the theatre and watched for many days, 
as if there were people acting, and showed his approval; and when he recovered from 
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his madness, he said that he had enjoyed the best time of his life.’105 The lack of any 
explanation or elaboration suggest that it was generally accepted that madness could cause 
sensory misperceptions which led to false beliefs. The enjoyable hallucinations that the man 
experiences are directly connected to his madness, which presumably cease when he is no 
longer in that state.  
Plato’s Theaetetus, a treatise on the nature and definition of knowledge also connects 
madness, in this case pathological, with sensory error, in a passage where Socrates 
challenges the validity of interlocutor Theaetetus’ claim that ‘knowledge is nothing else than 
perception’.106 Socrates proceeds to present a counter argument in which this idea proves 
defective: 
 
The defect is found in connection with dreams and diseases, including insanity 
(μανίας), and everything else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing 
and the other senses. For of course you know that in all of these the doctrine 
we were just presenting seems admittedly to be refuted, because in them we 
certainly have false perceptions107  
 
Thus, Plato recognised insanity, along with dreams and other diseases, as a condition which 
may cause erroneous perceptions. It is clear that there are some instances where information 
attained through the senses cannot be trusted. As Ahonen asserts madness has the implication 
of rendering its subject incapable of recognising that they may be interpreting sensory 
information incorrectly and furthermore, unaware of their madness, they form opinions 
based on their erroneous perceptions.108 
Such possibilities for misperception make the distrust of the senses a prominent trope 
in ancient epistemological discussions, which recognised that, although the senses play a 
crucial part in understanding the world around us, they are not unerring. The philosophers 
thus separated the cognitive abilities of perception and reason from early on, recognising 
that both were required for the attainment of knowledge.109 From Heraclitus we have perhaps 
the earliest example of the enduring idea that the ability to sense must be coupled with reason 
and understanding to avoid misconceptions.110 Those incapable of understanding the 
 
105 Mir. ausc. 31. 
106 Tht. 151e.3 
107 Tht. 157e. 
108 Ahonen (2014: 36). 
109 Caston (2015: 30).  
110 Against the Logicians, 1.126-127.  
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‘language of the senses’ he claims, are prone to error,111 to which Heraclitus introduces an 
evaluative dimension in his conviction that ‘[b]ad witnesses for humans are the eyes and 
ears of those who have barbarian souls’.112 To fully comprehend information delivered 
through the senses, he suggests that the sensations received through the sensory organs must 
be interpreted and understood correctly by the soul.113 This idea that the uncultivated or 
uneducated soul will be prone to sensory error becomes central to the philosophers’ ideas of 
why madness may give rise to false perceptions, as they begin to conceptualise madness in 
ways which suggest a moral degeneracy or failing.     
In the Timaeus (86b-c), for instance, Plato discusses ἄνοια (usually translated as 
‘folly’), as a disease of the soul (τὰ περὶ ψυχήν), the description of which Sassi asserts, is 
left intentionally broad so as to ‘include any immoral behaviour resulting from psychic 
conflict…’.114 Plato describes that this affliction of the soul can take the form of either 
‘ignorance’ or ‘madness’, the causality of which he relates to the condition of the body and 
to the effects of excessive pain or pleasure, surely alluding to states of mania and depression. 
As a result the individual is, ‘unable to either see or to hear anything correctly, and he is at 
such a time distraught and wholly incapable of reason.’115 This idea of madness as a 
condition of the soul permeates philosophical discussions of the topic, and takes on a 
particular significance in discussions of madness, which are viewed as a condition related to 
uncontrolled passions (emotions).116 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle expresses the view that passions can actually 
alter the state of the body and produce madness (1147a 16-18). This continuity between the 
body and soul is solidified in a passage from the [Physiognomics] with Aristotle’s comments 
on treatment: 
 
It seems to me that soul and body react on each other; Madness appears to be 
an affection of the soul, and yet physicians by purging the body with drugs, 
and in addition to these by prescribing certain modes of life can free the soul 
 
111 Graham (2013: 28). 
112 Against the Logicians, 1.126 
113 Graham (2013: 28). 
114 Sassi (2013: 413) who also asserts that this idea ‘is all but new in Plato’s work’. See also, Jouanna 
(2013: 104) who similarly identifies the idea of the diseased soul in the context of madness may well 
have been a Platonic innovation.  
115 Ti. 86c. 
116 See, for instance, Arist. Eth. Nic. VII.3 (7) and Pl. Res Pub. 571c-572b. 
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from madness. By treatment of the body the form of the body is released, and 
the soul is freed from its madness. 117 
 
This indicates that madness of the soul could manifest in ways that are more familiar in 
medical contexts. That is to say, sicknesses of the soul could be alleviated by medical means. 
However, we also find evidence which places the treatment of the soul firmly in the hands 
of the philosophers, for instance Democritus claims that ‘Medicine heals diseases of the 
body, while wisdom frees the soul from passions’.118  
The classical philosophers’ ideas that madness could arise from both a condition of 
the body (understood in physiological terms)119 and of the soul (conceptualised as a moral 
or ethical flaw), is also taken up by the Hellenistic philosophers. Here discussions of 
madness as a result of uncontrolled passions, or lack of self-restraint, become particularly 
prominent.120 The Stoics’ contention that anyone other than the hypothetical Stoic sage is 
considered insane is perhaps the most extreme example of what is known as a ‘general 
madness’, characterised by false beliefs based on misperceptions, which was supposedly 
commonplace.121 I think we can read this as reflecting an agenda of the philosophers which 
sought to develop a distinct form of philosophical medicine, that proposed that philosophical 
education was the best way to nurture the soul and achieve mental wellbeing.122 However, 
the Stoics’ also still recognised that the functioning of the soul could be affected by bodily 
imbalances which could precipitate disturbances of the soul, leading towards madness.123  
A final, important contribution to the connections between madness and non-typical 
perception is Plato’s conception of divine madness in the Phaedrus, which includes what we 
may term religious ‘visions’.124 Plato presents this form of madness as a positive 
phenomenon connected to creative and prophetic inspiration, which demonstrates that in 
certain contexts the ability to see things other could not was viewed as a privileged state, 
rather than a negative by-product of a mental illness.125 Thus, madness and hallucination in 
certain contexts may have been actively encouraged and revered. Archaeological studies 
 
117 [Phgn.] 808b. 
118 Democritus D30 (Taylor, 15). 
119 Phdr. 265a 9-10. 
120 Jouanna (2013: 105 n. 20). 
121 Thumiger (2017b: 53).  
122 See Gill (2013: 342-348) on the Hellenistic developments of a form of therapeutic writing which 
addressed harmful emotions, which he describes as a form of preventative psychological therapy.  
123 Ahonen (2018: 358). 
124 Phdr. 244c. See, Dodds (1951: 70) on the connection between the terms μάντις (seer) μαίνομαι 
(madness).  
125 Phdr. 244a-245c.  
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have even suggested that the prophetic visions of the Delphic oracle may have been induced 
through the use of psychoactive substances and, although this theory has been met with much 
criticism, if accepted it means that hallucinations may have been an important part of 
religious ritual.126 This shows that the philosophers, unlike the medical texts we encountered 
in the last chapter, also allow space for theological understandings, which includes madness 
as an inspired state, bestowed upon prophets, poets, lovers, and those in states of religious 
transcendence.127   
To summarise, in this section I have shown that philosophers recognised madness 
could arise from diseases of the body, but also from the soul, introducing ethical and moral 
reflections to the condition. It is clear that the philosophers recognised that both forms of 
madness could produce visions which did not coincide with objective reality; either by 
disrupting the process of perception, by leaving the mad man devoid of the reasoning powers 
required to distinguish real from erroneous sensations, or by opening up a realm of 
perception only available to a select and divinely chosen few.  
 
2.2 Ancient Theories of Vision 
In this section I turn to consider the philosophical theories of vision. Although I can only 
offer a general account here, it should provide sufficient evidence to examine how the 
philosophers understood that visual misperceptions, or the belief of a perceptual experience 
in the absence of an obvious external stimuli (vis-à-vis hallucination), could manifest in 
cases of madness.  
Michael Squire’s recent study of sight in antiquity establishes that visual perception 
is the sense that writers in Greaco-Roman antiquity ‘theorized above all others’.128 By our 
period of interest, discussions on the topic take on an increasingly technical character which 
include various theories upon how the individual senses function, the characteristics of 
perceptible objects and, most importantly for this enquiry, the problems that hallucination, 
illusion and misperception pose for an epistemic view of the senses.129  
Democritus’ account of vision is fundamentally informed by his materialist view of 
the world, which argued that the universe consists entirely of atoms which move constantly 
 
126 Lehoux (2007) provides an overview and critique of the theory.  
127 This is akin to the madness of the Homeric prophet Theoclymenus, which I employed in my 
introduction. 
128 Squire (2015: 1). 
129 Caston (2015: 29). 
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through the air colliding with one another, and what he terms ‘void’.130 Physical objects give 
off atomic effluences which retain qualities of the object from which they have been emitted. 
These effluences travel through the air, where a compression of sorts occurs, which creates 
an ‘impression’ of the perceivable object.131 The ‘impression’ once received by the eye is 
transmitted throughout the body where it is recognised and understood by the soul.132 This 
represents an intro-mission theory of vision, which explains it as a process that occurs when 
something, in this case effluences from objects, enter the eye. 
Plato, on the other hand, in the Timaeus (45b-46a) presents an extra-missionist theory 
of vision (the idea that vision is possible by rays or light emitted from the eyes which meet 
with objects of perception), framed within a wider discussion on the formation of man’s 
intellectual powers. According to Plato, pure fire within the body, ‘akin to that light of every 
day’, streams out from the pupil of the eye in a continuous flow.133 Visual perception occurs 
when this stream interacts with a perceivable object, which also emits a fire of sorts; both 
blend together to produce a single stream which is transmitted back into the eye, through the 
body, to the soul. It is also within the soul then, according to Plato, that the process of visual 
perception is made complete.134 
Whilst Aristotle agreed that the soul, which he places in the heart, was the locus of 
perception he argued that, ‘it is unreasonable to suppose that seeing occurs from something 
issuing from the eye’.135 For Aristotle, visual perception is ultimately brought about when 
the colour of an object acts upon the eye and becomes like the object of perception.136 
The Hellenistic models of vision function along broadly similar lines to those 
articulated in the Classical period. The Stoic position is captured succinctly by Greek 
doxographer Aëtius, writing in the first or second century AD: 
 
The Stoics say that the commanding-faculty (ἡγεμονικόν) is the soul’s highest 
part, which produces impressions (φαντασιῶν), assents, perceptions 
(αἰσθήσεις) and impulses. They also call it the reasoning faculty. From the 
 
130 Democritus’ views on vision are preserved by Theophrastus (De Sensibus, 50-56) who, although 
critiquing Democritus’ theory, offers us an account of its main components. For discussion of the 
relevant passages and overall discussion of vision according to Democritus see, Rudolph (2011) and 
Burkert (1977). 
131 Burkert (1977: 98).  
132 Burkert (1977: 101). 
133 Ti. 45c. 
134 Ti. 45d 
135 Arist. Parv. Nat. 438a.26-27. 
136 For a detailed account of Aristotle’s theory of the sense organs see, Johansen (1997). 
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commanding-faculty there are seven parts of the soul which grow out and 
stretch out into the body like the tentacles of an octopus… Sight is breath 
(πνεῦμα) which extends from the commanding-faculty to the eyes…137  
 
Aëtius’ description explicates the Stoic belief that the eye emanates a continuous flow of 
pneuma, or breath, which as it collides with objects, is directed back into the eye and 
registered by the brain, or rational part of the soul. The centre of cognition for the Stoics was 
the hegemonikon (ruling part of the soul), which the Stoics also believed consisted of 
pneuma, the very mixture they associated with perception. 138 
In contrast, the Epicurean approach to vision was firmly rooted in their atomist theory 
of matter. Following Democritus, they conceived that perceptible objects give off atomic 
films, which flew through the air and took the form of images (eidola, or simulacra) which 
penetrated the eye directly.139 The soul again is viewed as central to the process, an 
inscription which preserves the teaching of Epicurus dating to the second century AD reads: 
‘What is viewed by the eyesight is inherited by the soul.’140  
Despite the differing views amongst the philosophers on how exactly the perceptible 
quality of objects are received by the sensory organs, what is consistent is the idea that the 
soul was fundamental to the process of perceiving and understanding perceptions. As I have 
already established, mental illness in this period was often conceptualised as a sickness of 
the soul, which goes some way to explaining why madness may impact upon an individual’s 
perception of the world. With this in mind, I now turn to examine sources which elaborate 
on how hallucinations as a result of madness were enacted; I begin with a discussion of their 
supposed parallels with dreaming.  
 
2.3 Dreaming as non-veridical perception 
We have already seen that Plato equates madness and dreaming as two of the conditions that 
could produce illusions of sight in the Timaeus. The idea that hallucinations and dreams 
were viewed as homogenous, and fundamentally viewed as a visual process, has already 
been persuasively argued by Thumiger, who takes into account the shared vocabulary of 
 
137 Aët. 4.21.1-4 (LS, 53.H = SVF 2.863). 
138 Ahonen (2018: 358). 
139 Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 49-50 (LS, 15.A). 
140 Diog. of Oinoanda, fr. 5.3.3-14 (LS 15.E). 
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both events.141 This indicates experiences that we may attribute to the mind and imagination 
were, in antiquity, largely explained as visual experiences. Moreover, this similitude means 
that a consideration of the philosophers’ understandings of dreaming may also illuminate 
their views of hallucination. 
 Plato’s views of dreams are fundamentally linked to his theory of vision; in the 
Timaeus 45b-46a, he explains that dreaming occurs when the fire of the eyes is confined to 
the body during sleep. Having nowhere to go, the trapped fire is dispersed throughout the 
body which, if of a calm nature, results in sleep with mild dreaming. However, when the fire 
dispersed is of a more active character, increasingly vivid visions are produced, ‘when some 
greater motions remain, visions (phantasmata) corresponding in quality and number to the 
type and location of the remaining motions are formed internally, and are remembered as 
external when we wake.’142 It is worth noting that the term phantasmata is frequently used 
to describe visions or apparitions seen in waking contexts as well as sleeping, which I return 
to below.143 Although the Timaeus does not shed any light on the physiology of hallucination 
specifically, it does at least firmly establish that dreams are fundamentally connected to the 
Platonic theory of vision, which is made possible by the fiery nature of the eyes. This 
conceptualisation of dreams as somehow linked to visual perception is reinforced by 
Democritus who, according to Plutarch, imagines that dreams constitute perceptions 
absorbed by the pores of the body whilst asleep which ‘rise up’ to appear in the sleeper’s 
mind.144  This also evidences an explicit link with his theory of vision, which he believes 
occurs through the souls’ recognition of the perceptible atomic effluences given off by 
objects. 
According to Aristotle, dreams occur when residual images received by the sense 
organs during waking hours stimulate a movement in the heart (the locus of perception for 
Aristotle) during sleep.145 Like Plato, Aristotle uses the term phantasmata to describe the 
images enacted in dream states.146 The term that Aristotle uses to describe the process 
through which these images arise is an action called phantasia. In Parva Naturalia, Aristotle 
 
141 Thumiger (2017a: 295-310; 284ff.) argues that the vocabulary used to describe dreams and 
hallucinations are often interchangeable.. 
142 Ti. 45e-46a the translation of this particular passage is taken from Harris’ discussion of dreams in 
antiquity (2009: 252), all other translations of Plato from the LCL edition (trans. Bury) as listed in the 
bibliography. 
143 For example, in Plato’s description of seeing ghosts in Phd. 81d  he uses the φαντάσματα and 
εἴδωλα. 
144 Plut. Quaest. conv. 735a-b.  
145 Parv. Nat. 461a. 
146 For example Parv. Nat.  460b.18. 
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claims that residual sense-impressions in ‘the melancholic, the feverish and the intoxicated’ 
can produce visions that appear ‘confused and monstrous’, thereby evidencing that physical 
and mental illness, in this case melancholy, may affect the vividness of nonveridical 
perceptions.147 This is also conducive with the Hippocratic idea that dream visions for those 
in states of madness are likely to take on a frightening quality.  
Aristotle explicitly compares the mechanisms of dreaming with the deceptions that 
occur in illness, at 458b. 27-28: ‘the same faculty by which we are deceived in illness when 
we are awake causes affection in sleep also’, surely suggesting illnesses of a mental quality. 
In addition, he also proposes that the same residual images that produce dreams can reside 
(un-sensed) in the body during waking hours. They are not normally recognised by the soul 
as they are usually eclipsed by the more immediate sensations received by the senses in its 
active waking state. However, Aristotle’s suggestion that, ‘the sensation still remains 
perceptible even after the external object perceived has gone’ does provide an explanation 
as to why misperceptions might occur.148 This is interesting, as it indicates that if the 
conditions of visual perception are not fully actualised at the time of the initial sensory 
contact they may reappear later, whilst awake or sleeping, giving rise to perceptions which 
no-one else would be able to corroborate.  
These examples show that philosophical explanations for dreaming tend to 
understand the process as a semi-sensory event, linked to the faculty of phantasia.149 I 
believe that this capacity is crucial to the philosopher’s explanations for how hallucinations 
may occur. With this in mind, I now turn to examine the concept of phantasia, tracing its 
development from Plato to the Hellenistic philosophers, who give this concept significant 
attention.  
 
2.4 Perceptual Error and phantasia 
2.4.1 Plato and Aristotle 
In Plato the concept of phantasia is not discussed in relation to hallucination, but it is perhaps 
in his work that the word first appears.150 Notomi’s analysis of Plato’s use of the term in the 
Sophist (264a), the only text in which he offers an explicit definition, advocates that we 
ought to understand his use of the term as ‘perceptual judgement’ and further, that, ‘it must 
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mean ‘perceptual (mainly visual) appearance’.151 I also believe that Plato’ use of αἴσθησις 
(sensation) in relation to the concept reinforces that this ought to be read as relating to the 
senses, the judgement of which Plato describes as sometimes false.152 In the Republic, the 
related term phantasmata is employed by Plato amidst a discussion of imitative arts, as he 
considers that the artistic rendering of real objects can only create an appearance or likeness 
of the object, in other words it is simply an imitation of the real thing.153 The allusion that 
phantasmata are to be understood as an appearance establishes that they can denote an image 
of something which is in opposition to direct reality. For instance, we have already seen that 
Plato employed the term phantasmata to describe the images that people experience in 
dream states.  
Rees’ treatment of phantasia in Aristotle establishes that his conception goes far 
beyond anything found in Plato.’154 For Aristotle, phantasia is a faculty of the soul, which 
is distinguished from straightforward perception and thinking. However, I suggest that the 
common translation of the term in Aristotle as ‘imagination’ fails to capture the sensorial 
qualities of its functioning and conception.155 Lycos’ translation of phantasia as ‘the faculty 
of presentation’ and phantasma as the actual ‘presentation’ is, in my opinion, a far more 
appropriate interpretation of this concept.156 Let us see what Aristotle has to say on the topic 
of definition (De An. 429a 4-9): 
 
Since sight is the chief sense, the name φαντασία is derived from φάος (light), 
because without light it is impossible to see. Again, because [φαντασία] persist 
in us and resemble sensations, living creatures frequently act in accordance 
with them, some, viz., the brutes, because they have no mind, and some, vis., 
men, because the mind is temporarily clouded over by emotion, or disease, or 
sleep. 
 
His explanation of the term which he relates to light, a precondition of seeing, makes it clear 
that Aristotle clearly related phantasia to the physical act of vision and the production of 
mental images.157 He also clearly cites emotion, disease and sleep as conditions which cause 
men to think that the images of phantasia, which resemble sense impressions, are real. As 
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we have established, Aristotle viewed uncontrolled emotion as one of the conditions which 
could alter the body and induce madness.  
The term phantasmata in Aristotle denotes the appearances that arise when phantasia 
is enacted.158 The phantasmata of phantasia are connected to visuality, both in how they 
come about and how they are experienced.159 As we have seen, Aristotle contends that the 
images of phantasia are felt as a sensory-like experience informed by real perceptions, which 
may give rise to perceptions that are no longer representative of present surroundings or 
objects, as they are produced by past stimuli.160 In other words, the capacity of phantasia 
means that people can experience certain perceptions (phantasmata) of absent stimuli (i.e. 
hallucinations), which no one else will be able to see, as they are informed by prior 
perceptual experiences.161  
 
2.4.2 The Stoics 
The Stoics, Skeptics and Epicureans offer some novel ideas about hallucination, which are 
also connected to their discussions of phantasia, or ‘impressions’, as they are commonly 
translated in Stoic and Epicurean contexts.  
The Stoic interest in the concept centres around their belief that humans are endowed 
with the means to attain knowledge through, what they term, cataleptic phantasia (or, 
cognitive impressions). According to Diogenes Laertius, following the Stoic idea that 
impressions are stamped upon the soul,162 he explicates that cognitive impressions will 
always provide a true representation of reality, whereas non-cataleptic (non-cognitive) 
impressions will not: 
 
Of impressions, one kind is cognitive, the other incognitive. The cognitive, 
which they [the Stoics] say is the criterion of things, is that which arises from 
what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is. (3) 
The incognitive is either that which does not arise from what is, or from that 
which is but not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not clear or 
distinct.163 
 
158 Arist. De. An. (428a1-2).  
159 Johansen (2012: 199). 
160 See Modrak (2016: 16-17) who emphasises that phantasia, unlike perception proper is prone to error 
as it is based on information retained from sensory information, rather than a perception itself. 
161 See Moss (2012: 100). 
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This indicates that sensory impressions can be categorised as non-cataleptic if an error 
occurs in its perception, or if it arises from anything which is not based in reality. Any 
deviation from the normal functioning of the sensory process (for example, a change to the 
state of the pneuma, an interruption in its communication back towards the eye, or anything 
that impairs or affects the functioning of the rational part of the soul) could affect this process 
and give rise to perceptions which will not provide an accurate representation of the world 
around us. The Stoic’s analogy of the sensory faculties extending throughout the body like 
tentacles also indicates that the health and functioning of the body overall could have a 
bearing.164 Indeed, Ahonen, in his analysis of Stoic madness, argues that both the body’s 
senses and a healthy mind were a precondition for the production of cataleptic 
impressions.165 This shows a continuum with the ideas articulated in the Hippocratic texts 
that we encountered in the previous chapter, in that physical illnesses could result in 
disruptions to normal sensory functioning. 
We have now established that it is possible for impressions to arise from what is not, 
and that they can arise in a way that does not accurately represent what is. The second 
century AD physician and Skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus, writing about the Stoics, 
gives an example of such a circumstance: 
 
Of true impressions, some are cataleptic and some are not. Those [which] are 
not cataleptic befall people because of illness. Innumerable people suffering 
from phrenitis or melancholy receive an impression that is true but not 
cataleptic, as it is produced accidently and fortuitously, and therefore they often 
are not convinced by it and do not assent to it.166 
 
This passage shows that illness, specifically phrenitis and melancholy, were accepted as 
conditions which could cause non-cataleptic phantasia. This is not an isolated instance and 
elsewhere in a discussion of why non-cognitive impressions occur Sextus turns again to 
madness, claiming that non-cataleptic impressions, ‘strike us from what is not real, as in the 
case of crazy people’ and when impressions received ‘do not resemble just that real thing … 
[as is] the case of Orestes in his madness.’167 That Sextus chooses to give the figure of the 
infamous Orestes as an example exemplifies that madness was seen as a common 
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explanation for seeing things which do not exist in reality. It is worth noting Sextus’ 
suggestion, in the quote above, that not all those suffering from a mental illness will succumb 
to non-cataleptic impressions, and assent to them. This suggests that even those experiencing 
misperceptions as a result of madness will still sometimes be capable of discerning cognitive 
from non-cognitive phantasia.168  
To understand Sextus’ claim that true impressions are not necessarily cataleptic, we 
must consider the criteria for the truth and falsity of impressions. One of the examples he 
offers of a false impression is the phenomenon of optical illusions; he gives several examples 
(a straight oar can appear bent when viewed in water or a colonnade appears to narrow as it 
extends into the distance).169 These are not hallucinations but illusions, which do not fully 
represent reality. However, Sextus goes on to describe that impressions can be both true and 
false, again employing the figure of Orestes who sees his sister Electra as a Fury. Electra is 
real, as she is present and exists, but, Orestes’ impression that the figure he sees before him 
is a Fury is false.170 That Orestes’ impression is described as non-cataleptic, but also true 
and false, further complicates the matter. His false interpretation of Electra as a Fury is 
harder to assign to the sphere of optical illusion, or merely a slightly distorted view of reality. 
It seems clear that Sextus is not discussing hallucination, in the sense of seeing things in the 
absence of external stimuli, but it raises questions about the validity of some impressions, 
even those which do have a ‘true’ external stimulus. Therefore, I suggest that the Stoics’ 
idea of illusory impressions may have been understood as varying in its degree of distortion, 
with hallucinations at the far end of the spectrum. The impressions of those in states of illness 
and madness may thus be true but not cataleptic, and individuals in states of madness are 
unable to judge them as such.  
A final form of impression described by the Stoics, which is connected to madness, 
arguably falls into the non-sensory category, in that it is not received through the sensory 
organs. Aëtius’ presents that Chrysippus’ conceived of four different types of impression 
(phantasia, phantaston, phantastikon and phantasma). Phantasma here denotes a figment of 
the imagination (phantastikon), described as an affection of the soul, which arises without 
an ‘impresser’ i.e. a perceptible stimulus. He continues that, ‘it occurs in people who are 
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melancholic and mad’.171 The phantasmata of madness described here have no basis in 
reality unlike the explanations for Orestes’ misinterpretation of Electra as a Fury. In this case 
a phantasma is formed purely from the imagination, with no external stimuli and is therefore 
closer to more modern understandings of hallucination as an entirely mental process.  
 
2.4.3 The Skeptics 
The Skeptics base their critique of the Stoic idea that knowledge can be attained through 
cataleptic phantasia on the difficulties of distinguishing true impressions from false ones.172 
They propose that non-cataleptic impressions can be as clear and distinct as cataleptic ones, 
which causes a problem for the Stoic idea that it is possible to distinguish between them. 
The Skeptics contend that, ‘The apprehensive [cataleptic] appearance, then, does not have 
any peculiarity by which it differs from false and non-apprehensive [non-cataleptic] 
appearances.’173 If we imagine that hallucinations often appear to their subject as a distinct, 
clear, and convincing, this presents a difficulty for the idea that one ought to be capable of 
judging their veracity infallibly. Therefore, the Skeptics reject the Stoic idea that cataleptic 
impressions are to be viewed as the criterion of knowledge.174 
Furthermore, although the Skeptics consider that the mental and physical state of an 
individual at the moment of perception may have an impact on the quality of their 
impressions,175 they also stress the subjectivity of sensory experience in a way that implies 
neither truth nor falsity, for instance, ‘the same coat which seems of a bright yellow colour 
to men with blood-shot eyes does not appear so to me’176 Moreover, the Skeptics’ challenge 
ideas which assign the production of ‘improper impressions’ to illness or an internal 
imbalance of the body. Their stance is that as men naturally differ in their humoral 
compositions, even in healthy states, there is no way of establishing an all-embracing 
concept of a ‘normal’ or the ‘natural’; a state of sickness is natural to the sick man, health 
would be unnatural, and vice versa.177 
 
 
171 Aëtius states that Chrysippus says that phantasma occur in people who are melancholic and mad, 
again employing the figure of Orestes to elucidate what he describes, Aët. 4.12.1-5 (LS 39B = SVF 
2.54).  
172 Prentice (1968: 343). 
173 Sext. Emp. Against the Logicians, 1.411. 
174 For a detailed analysis of the Skeptic attack of Stoic epistemology, see Frede (1983:65-93). 
175 Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.101. 
176 ibid. 
177 ibid. 1.102. 
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2.4.4 The Epicureans 
The Epicureans, like the Stoics, also saw sensation (aisthesis) as the standard of truth.178 
However, the Epicureans unlike the Stoics, argued that every aisthesis is true.179 As I 
described in this chapter’s opening section, visual perception according to the Epicureans is 
the stimulation of the sensory faculties by eidola that fly through the air. If these eidola reach 
the eye intact, and have not undergone any changes, the impression will accord directly with 
reality, which as we have seen, the Stoics would term a cataleptic impression. In Epicurean 
thought phantasia, ‘is the appearance made by the content of a sensation, in this case it is 
the immediate object of perception.’180 For the Epicureans, as all sensations are true so are 
all phantasia, as they must be born from sensory contact with existent things.181  
One Epicurean view of hallucination is that these eidola, if of a particularly fine 
nature, are able to enter the mind directly, where they are perceived without the requirement 
of passing through the sensory organs. These impressions may be entirely consistent with 
reality if they have emanated from an object and have gone directly into the mind without 
undergoing any changes; this can be understood as a way of seeing without the use of the 
eyes as a receptor.182 At other times the eidola intermingle in mid-air before flowing into the 
mind thus creating a distorted vision; it is by this process that the late Epicurean poet 
Lucretius describes that humans have seen mythical animals such as centaurs, where the 
atoms of a horse and man are combined and produce the image of a half-man, half-horse in 
the mind.183 Following this logic Epicureans assert that all impressions, even hallucinations, 
are true.  
Thus, the Epicureans contend that hallucinations and dreams, although they can 
misrepresent reality, are in fact informed by a composite blend of atomic effluences from 
real things. This gives some context to Diogenes’ account of Epicurus’ claims that even the 
phantasmata of madness and sleep are true.184 Sextus Empiricus’ account of Epicurus again 
employs the hallucinations of Orestes to elucidate his explanation of why hallucinations 
ought to be judged as ‘true’: ‘In the case of Orestes, anyway, when he thought he was looking 
at Furies, the sensation that was activated by the images was true (for the images did exist), 
 
178 Taylor (1980: 105), this idea is attributed to Epicureanism’s founding figure, Epicurus. 
179 Taylor (1980: 115). 
180 See, Güremon (2017: 187-188) who provides a helpful analysis on the vocabulary linked to 
Epicurean ideas of perception. 
181 Pigeaud (1983: 35-36) and Taylor (1980: 115). 
182 Lucr. 4.724-756 (LS, 15D). 
183 Lucr. 4.722-822 (LS, 15D).  
184 Diog. Laert. 10.31-32 (LS, 16B). 
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but the intellect in thinking that they were solid Furies was false opinion’.185 This 
explanation opposes the Stoic view that hallucinations may merely be figments of the 
imagination which do not find their origin in reality. The hallucinations of the mythical 
madman are stimulated by real sensory information, but the effects of his madness to his 
overall cognitive capacities, leads him to the false opinion that the Furies are real and solid, 
perceptible beings. The Epicureans’ thesis that all perceptions are true, even hallucinations, 
finds its basis in the idea that hallucinations occur when the eidola penetrate the mind 
directly, often in a confused and mixed state, and crucially for this argument these eidola are 
real, perceptible atoms.  
 In summary, phantasia seems to be one of the primary theories that the philosophers’ 
employed to account for misperceptions. In Aristotle, for instance, we saw that the capacity 
of phantasia meant that people could experience perceptions of absent stimuli, which he 
explained were informed by earlier visual perceptions – following the very same principles 
he used to explain dreaming.  
The Hellenistic philosophers also largely understood hallucinations as a perceptual 
experience. The Epicureans’ view of hallucination is also informed by their theories of 
vision. Here we saw the contention that all phantasia, even hallucinations, are, in a sense, 
true as they are informed by real perceptible stimuli. Hallucinations could arise when eidola 
were received directly by locus of perception in a confused state, rather than through the 
sensory organs. The Stoic’s contended, only ‘cataleptic’ and ‘true’ phantasia provided 
infallible perceptions of the world. Non-cataleptic impressions – those which pertain to 
hallucination – could be instigated by a variety of different factors, including disruptions to 
the functioning of the senses in states of madness.  
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
That perception is a central component in ancient theories of knowledge explains why the 
philosophers give the subject of hallucination (the most extreme example of the fallibility of 
the senses) such careful attention. If we are capable of misperceptions, which we surely are, 
how do we know that what we perceive is a true representation of the world around us?  
One explanation given for hallucinations, which addresses the problem that they pose 
for the epistemic authority of the senses was madness. Madness was understood to have the 
potential to disrupt the processes of vision and the ability to make reasonable judgements 
 
185 Sext. Emp. Against the Logicians, 2.63. 
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about the impressions received by the sensory organs, and to give rise to false beliefs. 
Therefore, madness could be viewed as a catalyst for hallucinations, illusions and 
misperceptions, which did not entirely undermine the epistemic nature of the senses. That 
madness according to the philosophers is viewed as both a sickness of the body and of the 
soul introduces an ethical and moral aspect to their views of the misperceptions of madness, 
as they suggest that only those who are capable of controlling their emotions and always 
acting according to reason are capable of correctly understanding information attained by 
the senses. In other words, only when not in a state of madness are we likely to understand 
sensory information correctly and experience only veridical perceptions.  
The philosophers’ differing theories of vision clearly inform their understandings of 
how hallucinations may occur. The phenomena of hallucination and dreaming within which, 
in the words of Plato, ‘we certainly have false perceptions’ are both fundamentally informed 
by their understanding of how visual processes occurs. A further explanation for 
hallucinations is offered which attributes their existence to a faculty involved in the 
production of images, called phantasia. The philosophers offer various explanations for the 
production of phantasmata with the common feature that, although loosely informed by real 
sensory stimuli, they are more prone to error.  
As we have seen, the later philosophers frequently drew upon the tragic figure 
Orestes to elucidate their arguments and ideas on phantasia. Therefore, we can assume that 
they expected that most would be familiar with his story and hold the view that hallucinations 
and madness were reciprocal. It is the representation of hallucination in tragedy that I turn 
my attention to in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
Hallucination in Athenian Tragedy 
 
 
For the term phantasia … has now come to 
be used predominantly of passages where, 
inspired by strong emotion, you seem to 
see what you describe and bring it vividly 
before the eyes of your audience. 
Longinus, On the Sublime, 15.1-2 
 
One of the ways in which the concept of phantasia, which we met in the last chapter in an 
epistemological and perceptual context, is developed in later thought is illustrated by the 
quote above from the literary critic ps. Longinus, writing in the first-century AD.186 Here we 
see a semantic shift in the use of the term to represent a process of visualisation, aroused by 
an emotional stimulus, which lends itself to sublime literary expression.187 In this context 
phantasia becomes the ability to formulate visions internally, the inception of which need 
not, as we have already seen, be directly stimulated or informed by sensation.188 Phantasia 
is thus an important part of the playwright’s process of bringing his visions alive for an 
audience. In this way, the very creation and experience of tragedy is aligned with the faculty 
that the philosophers of the Classical and Hellenistic periods connected to the production of 
dreams and hallucinations.189 
 Furthermore, in his discussion of phantasia Longinus immediately calls upon 
Athenian tragedy, citing Euripides’ conception of the mad Orestes’ visions, ‘[i]n these 
passages the poet himself saw (εἶδεν) Furies and compelled the audience almost to see what 
he had visualised’ (15.3).190 Longinus’ choice to employ an instance of madness from Greek 
 
186 On the issues of date and attribution see, Russell (1964: xxii-xxx) and Heath (2012: 15-16). 
187 Watson (1988: 66-68) stresses the importance of Longinus’ discussion of the term to the transformation 
in meaning, describing it as an early conceptualisation of the imagination. 
188 Doran (2018 :70)  ‘…phantasia not only makes absent things present; it also creates things no mind 
has seen in actual perception’.  
189 O’Connell (2017: 229-230) highlights the relationship between the concept of phantasia and enargeia 
(vividness), which has a long history as a critical term, describing phantasia as the ‘cognitive process of 
visualisation’ which makes enargeia possible. For more on the relationship between these terms see, 
Webb, 2009: 93-97. 
190 Compare Quin. Inst. 6.2.29 who pushes the perceptual aspect of this idea further still in his 
discussion of oratory, asserting that phantasia allows us to ‘actually see them [absent things] with our 
own eyes and have them physically present to us’. 
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tragedy highlights that the emotive power of Orestes’ hallucinations had clearly lost none of 
its potency centuries later.191  
In this chapter, I consider the treatment of hallucination as a symptom of madness in 
Athenian tragedy.192 My decision to focus my literary enquiry of hallucination on tragic 
examples is instigated by the fact that issues of seeing and visual misunderstanding become 
an important thematic concern in the tragedies of the Classical Period; Harris’ survey of 
instances of hallucination in tragedy connects madness to ten of the eleven plays which 
feature hallucination, a notable proportion.193 As Thumiger describes, ‘[h]allucination can 
almost be called a genre-specific tool and is a pervasive motif in ancient drama, where it 
stages themes of ethical transgressions and misjudgements.’194 Furthermore, it is from 
tragedy that perhaps some of the most memorable accounts of hallucinatory madness have 
been transmitted. We have already seen, for instance, that the philosophers drew upon tragic 
hallucinations to elucidate their understanding of the phenomenon.195  
I begin this discussion by outlining some of the main characteristics of madness in 
tragedy, which I will argue shows a partiality for the visual aspects of madness in both its 
aetiology and symptomatology. I will argue that the dramatisation of hallucination provides 
an effective tool for exploring the effects of madness, which are often central to the play’s 
plot development. This will lay the groundwork for a close consideration of two plays I have 
selected which use hallucination in the embodiment of their character’s madness: (1) Io’s 
hallucinations in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound and (2) the aforementioned depiction of 
Orestes’ visions in Euripides’ Orestes. These plays, in particular, will allow me to 
demonstrate that the tragedians exhibited a remarkable awareness that hallucinations could 
be highly individualised and connected to personal experience and psychology, a 
consideration which is mainly absent from the medical and philosophical texts considered 
in the chapters above.196 Overall, I will show that the playwrights adopt a pluralistic stance 
 
191 It should be noted that Longinus distinguishes between rhetorical and poetical phantasia (at 15.2 and 
15.8-11). Rhetoric aims at ‘ἐνάργεια’ (vividness), whereas the aim of poetic phantasia is to ‘ἔκπληξις’ 
(surprise), see Zanker (1981: 304). 
192 Harris (2013a: 292) identifies that: ‘hallucinatory visions are usually in tragedy signs of madness’. See 
also, Most (2013: 404) who identifies that visual hallucinations specifically are most common. 
193 Harris (2013a: 292). 
194 Thumiger (2017a: 307-308). 
195 On the idea that this dialogue goes both ways see Thumiger (2013b) who connects the motif of vision 
in tragedy to contemporary epistemological debates in philosophical writing. 
196 To what extent the tragedians develop the psychology and ‘inner life’ of their characters is disputed. 
See, for instance, Gill (1990) who frames the argument in terms of ‘character’ vs. ‘personality’ (i.e. with 
the latter incorporating notions of psychology and the ‘self’) which builds on an earlier article (1986) on 
the same topic. See also, Gould (1978: 45) who argues that there is little evidence of ‘the workings of a 
complex inner personality’ in Greek tragic characterisation, in contrast to later drama. Therefore, my 
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to the causes of hallucination, which focalise physiological, supernatural and psychological 
origins.   
 
3.1 The Visuality of Tragic Madness: Cause and Effect 
It should be stated that when it comes to the causes of madness, tragedy maintains the 
overarching notion that illness (physical and mental) is caused by the gods, often in the form 
of a divine punishment or familial curse.197 However, even a cursory reading shows that the 
writers engaged with the complexities of madness from early on, which took them far 
beyond a simply divine view.198 Take, for instance, Phaedra’s madness in Euripides’ 
Hippolytus which takes the form of an intense erotic desire for her stepson (39). Phaedra’s 
condition is clearly attributed to the god Aphrodite, which the god herself confirms in the 
prologue (28-29) and Phaedra also seems aware that her madness comes from a divine 
source, ‘I have gone mad, a god possessed me and I fell’ (240-241). This idea of divine 
origin is reiterated by the Chorus who initially presume that her illness is the work of some 
divinity (141-148). However, they go on to postulate that the cause of her madness may be 
the result of a psychological or physiological response. They suppose firstly that Phaedra’s 
madness takes the form of an intense state of emotionality, a sentiment that shows parallels 
with the philosophers’ views of madness resulting from the passions; perhaps, they suggest, 
she has learned of her husband’s infidelity or received bad news from her homeland, which 
has resulted in a maddening jealousy or grief (151-159)?199 Secondly, the Chorus consider 
whether her sex means that she may be predisposed to depressive states, ‘[w]omen’s nature 
is an uneasy harmony, and with it is wont to dwell the painful unhappy helplessness of birth 
pangs and their delirium’ (161-163). Thus, the Chorus convey to the audience that madness 
can come from a divine source, take the form of an acute emotional reaction, or even be 
related to gender and physiology. Therefore, we have additional explanations for her state 
of madness, which go beyond divine causation. 
The symptoms of tragic madness emphasise overall the perceptual disturbances it 
can produce. Madness in tragedy can produce nonveridical visions, distort reality and make 
one see things that are not really there. Ruth Padel’s work on tragic madness argues that 
 
discussion, which develops an idea that the tragedians show an awareness, to some extent, of personal 
and psychological factors challenges this notion. 
197 Padel (1995: 149-150). 
198 Saïd (2013: 373) traces the concept of ‘mental illness’ as distinct from god-given madness back to 
Aeschylus. 
199 See Segal (1988) for a discussion of the ways in which Euripides connects misperception to the 
effects of harmful passions in this play. 
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madness is bound up with vision in a particularly strong way; she explores metaphors of 
madness which present sanity and insanity in terms of light and dark, seeing and non-seeing 
and notes that madness darkens and confuses perception which leads to gross errors in visual 
understanding.200  
Several plays suggest that madness has its genesis in the eyes of the individual. 
Ajax’s madness, for instance, is brought about by Athena as she alters the power and 
functioning of his eyes: ‘I shall place his eyes in darkness, even though they see’ (Soph. Aj. 
86).201 That a visual stimulus can effect a madness of sorts is also presented in defence of 
Helen’s irrational behaviour in Eurpides’ Trojan Women who, after seeing (εἰσιδοῦσα) Paris, 
was (ἐξεμαργώθης φρένας) driven mad with eros (991-992). The eroticised madness of 
Phaedra is also exercised by Aphrodite through the power of vision (Eur. Hipp. 24-33).202 
Abnormalities in the appearance and condition of the eyes, which I return to below, are an 
important signifier of mental disturbance. 
The importance of vision as a theme can be linked directly to the theatrical medium, 
which in its essence is a visual spectacle. Most’s analysis of madness in tragedy theorises 
that the use of hallucination could constitute a metatheatrical comment, showing a self-
conscious awareness that the visuals being created are not real.203 This explanation echoes 
the view of Longinus, quoted in the opening of this chapter, in the sense that it allies the 
experience of the construction of tragedy with the visuals it creates.  
Most also offers a practical explanation for why visual hallucinations, in particular, 
are most common, arguing that they could be more easily staged than their auditory, 
olfactory or tactile counterparts.204 Following this idea, I propose that such considerations in 
staging can also be extended to explain why hallucination is more readily adopted in 
theatrical representations of madness than other recognised symptoms, such as depressive 
states, internal imbalances, general delirium or neurotic behaviour, which would be harder 
to communicate in a theatrical setting. We may suppose that the use of hallucination to 
represent madness also has its roots in clinical observations, supported by scholars who have 
 
200 Padel (1995: 47ff.)   
201 See also (69-70): ‘I shall divert the rays of his eyes’. 
202 Segal (1988: 279; 281). 
203 Most (2013: 405-406). See Vernant (1990: 187-188) for the classic treatment of the idea that the tragic 
spectator was entirely conscious of the illusory nature of theatre, which should be understood as an 
essential component of the dramatic spectacle. 
204 Most (2013: 404).  
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established that the tragedians frequently incorporated medical terminology in depictions of 
suffering.205  
The hallucinations of tragic characters are often of central importance to the play’s 
plot development and in effecting their dramatic climax. Hallucination can be viewed as 
providing plausible explanations for the catastrophic errors in judgement shown by certain 
characters, which were often of central importance. It is Ajax’s delusions, sent by the god 
Athena, which cause Ajax to slaughter a herd of cattle in the belief that he is attacking his 
enemies (Soph. Aj, 51-53).206 His resulting suicide, the dramatic pivot of the play, is directly 
linked to this error in judgement and the shame he feels. Another case of divinely induced 
madness, which causes catastrophic errors as a result of disrupted visual perception is seen 
in the character of Heracles, who kills his own wife and children in the belief that they are 
that of his enemies (Eur. Heracl. 830-842). These examples reflect the conventions of tragic 
storytelling, which Aristotle believed ought to depict the downfall of the protagonist brought 
about by an error (hamartia) in judgement.207 Hallucinations act as a device to propel the 
characters to act in a way that results in long-lasting suffering and anguish. 
Finally, I suggest that another use of hallucination in drama is that they are an 
effective way of communicating a character’s internal state of mind. The medium of theatre 
requires the vocalisation of a character’s thoughts, feelings and motivations. It is this aspect 
that makes tragedy a particularly interesting source in the pursuit of constructing an 
understanding of hallucination as it offers us introspective accounts of the experience of 
madness unlike any other source from the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Whilst these 
accounts are of course fictional, we can imagine that the writers were drawing upon their 
own worldly knowledge to create presentations of their character’s internal states, 
motivations and influences, while also demonstrating their own understanding of madness 
and hallucination. 
So far then, we have established that the tragic poets used hallucination as a dramatic 
device to signify a character’s madness to the audience, as a means of explaining the actions 
of mad characters and as a device to communicate their inner workings. The causes of 
hallucination in tragedy are always linked back to madness, which was seen primarily as a 
divinely imposed state. However, the playwrights also considered other factors which took 
them beyond this traditional divine view of the origins of madness. With this in mind, I now 
 
205 Jouanna (2012: 71-74). 
206 It should be noted that Ajax’s madness primarily affects his vision, not his actions, as he has already 
resolved to commit his hubristic act before Athena’s intervention.  
207 Poet. 1453a.7-10. 
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turn to my selected case studies to examine some of the ways in which the tragedians portrayed 
hallucinations which, I believe, show and express a variety of different influences and 
explanations. 
 
3.2 Aeschylus’ Io 
Aeschylus’ presentation of Io in Prometheus Bound is one of the earliest examples of 
hallucination being used to represent a character’s madness in tragedy.208 In this section I 
discuss some of the ways in which Aeschylus presents her character and reflect upon his 
portrayal of her visions.  
Many have noted that the brief inclusion of Io in the story of Prometheus is 
surprising; nowhere previously were the two myths combined.209 Her appearance is most 
readily explained by Io and Prometheus’ shared connection to Heracles. Heracles, a future 
descendant of Io, is ultimately responsible for releasing Prometheus from his punishment at 
the hands of Zeus.210 However, a further connection is made by Aeschylus who emphasises 
Zeus’s role in instigating her sufferings. Io attributes her misery to Zeus at lines 577-80 and 
again at 759, only mentioning Hera once at line 600, in contrast to other portrayals which 
place Io’s suffering firmly in the goddess’ hands.211 Therefore, in Aeschylus’ presentation 
the suffering of Prometheus and Io has a common source. However, unlike Prometheus, 
whose suffering takes the form of largely physical endurance, Io is subjected to torture of a 
more psychological kind.212  
Aeschylus’ introduction of Io to the stage immediately establishes her state of 
disorientation, ‘What land? What people? Whom should I say I see…’ (562). Visual 
uncertainty of this sort is repeated elsewhere in later tragic depictions of mad characters, for 
instance when Agave’s madness subsides following the frenzied murder of her son, she 
 
208 For the sake of convenience, I assume Aeschylean authorship; for the issues of authenticity and 
dating see Griffith (1977: 8-18). Perhaps earlier is Aeschylus’ depiction of Cassandra, which I discuss 
below, p. 54. 
209 Griffith (1983: 189) and Taplin (1977: 265-267). 
210 On the weaving of Prometheus and Io’s past, present and future in the play see, Griffith (1983: 188-
19). 
211 See Montiglio (2005: 19-20) who argues that the traditional role that Hera’s plays in Io’s wandering 
madness is glossed over in this play. 
212 One may of course argue that Io’s (suggested) transformation can be read as a physical affliction, but 
O’Brien Moore (1924: 88) notes that it is only Io herself who mentions her cow-state in this play, 
suggesting that this may be related to her hallucinations. 
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stresses a return to the brightness and clarity of her vision.213 Once Agave’s visual perception 
is no longer distorted by her madness Cadmus urges her to look properly (σκέψαι νυν ὀρθῶς) 
at the ‘lion’s’ head she holds in her hands and she is able to see for the first time the truth of 
what she has done (Eur. Bacch. 1279ff.). Similarly, Io’s opening lines show that she is 
experiencing visual uncertainty, which coincides with her obvious mental distress.214 
The traditional version of the Io myth is that Hera caught her husband Zeus in the act 
of seducing the young Io.215 Hera then transformed Io into a cow and enlisted the many-eyed 
beast Argos to keep guard of Io.216 It follows that Argos is killed by Hermes under Zeus’ 
instruction and this prompts Hera to send a gadfly to torment Io.217 The sting of the gadfly 
caused her to wander the world in her attempt to escape it. However, it is interesting that in 
Aeschylus’ presentation he tends to focus the cause of Io’s flight not only on the gadfly, as 
the traditional myth relates, but chiefly on her fear of Argos (566-560):   
 
Some gadfly (οἶστρος) is again stinging me in my misery –  
I am fleeing from the spectre (εἴδωλον) of Earth’s son, Argos I am afraid 
To look upon (εἰσορῶσα) the herdsman with ten thousand eyes, 
But he comes with his shifty gaze –  
He’s dead, but not even earth cover him over. 
 
Io’s admission that although she knows that Argos is dead he remains visible (and audible) 
to her is striking, particularly as the presentation of Argos as an εἴδωλον has no known 
antecedent.218 Therefore, we may assume that this is an innovation by Aeschylus which 
deserves some attention.  
Identifying whether this εἴδωλον denotes a ghost or a false vision is difficult, as the 
term is ambiguous in this regard. Io’s contention at line 571, that Argos has crossed over 
from the dead, may suggest that we are to understand this as the ghost of Argos. However, 
Aeschylus has already established that Io is disorientated and experiencing visual 
uncertainty, which suggests that her perception of Argos may not be all it seems. Podlecki’s 
commentary of the passage highlights that Io’s acknowledgement of Argos’ death means 
 
213 Eur. Bacch. 1266: ‘It is brighter than before and clearer’. We may compare Pentheus hallucinations in 
this play which are also connected to Dionysus and thus have a divine origin (618-622; 630ff. and 922ff.).  
214 Podlecki (2005: 180) notes Io’s use of dochmiacs in this scene, which in tragedy are usually a sign of 
mental aberrancy.  
215 Gantz (1993: 198ff.) 
216 See, Aesch. Supp. 299-308. 
217 Griffith (1983: 210). 
218 See Gantz (1993: 198-203). 
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that she shows an awareness that she is hallucinating. 219 I think that this can be supported 
by some of the other aspects of Io’s portrayal in this play, which seem to suggest that her 
perceptions of Argos could be psychological rather than simply supernatural. For instance, 
it is notable that Aeschylus presents fear as a defining feature of Io’s character.220 Medical 
descriptions often identified fearfulness in cases of hallucination connected to madness.221 
In this regard, it also seems notable that Io is frequently described by the characters in the 
play as suffering from a sickness (lines 597, 606 and 631). Rather than call upon the gods to 
call off her pursuers Io appeals to the Chorus for a medical cure, ‘What medicine is there for 
my illness (νόσου)’ (606). Surely a further indication that Io recognises that her visions may 
now be the result of some psychological or physical disorder, rather than god-sent 
persecutions. Furthermore, Io’s contemplation of suicide to escape her unwanted visions 
(583-585 and again at 746-751) shows Aeschylus has an awareness that hallucinations could 
have a severe psychological impact on those who experience them, which again reflects 
clinical observations of the symptom.222 
This leads me to believe that Aeschylus’ introduction of Argos’ εἴδωλον is invented 
to call into question the physicality of Io’s torment, in opposition to the traditional telling 
where both the gadfly and Argos are certainly material, even if only on a divine level. I think 
that Aeschylus is suggesting that Io’s earlier encounter with the beast Argos has produced a 
lasting psychological impact and she cannot shake him from her thoughts. By describing 
that the dead Argos is still tormenting her, Aeschylus again draws attention to the idea that 
Io’s pursuers may be created internally. This seems to be supported by other textual 
traditions that use the gadfly as a metaphor for frenzy and wandering madness, which may 
find its origin here.223 Although we must recognise, as the myth goes, that her suffering 
originated from a ‘real’ gadfly and the ‘real’ Argos sent by Hera, Aeschylus presentation 
seems to be offering the opportunity to interpret her perceptions as immaterial, and as a result 
of earlier traumatic experience.  
Aeschylus may also be alluding to the connections between dream images and 
hallucinations, highlighted in other sources, in his characterisation. Io recalls that she 
resisted a series of dream-like visions ‘ὅψεις ἕννυχοι’ which were sent to encourage her out 
 
219 Podlecki (2005: 180). 
220 For example, lines 566-568 and (677-680) where Io again mentions her fear of Argos. The effects 
that fear can have on the mind (φρένας) have already been established earlier in the play by the Chorus 
of Oceanids, when they first encounter Prometheus bound to his rock (181). 
221 For example, Hipp. Virg, [Potter, 538] which highlights the young female’s state as ‘frightened and 
afraid’, which are followed by strange hallucinations. 
222 See Virg. [Potter, 359-363]. 
223 Padel (1995: 15). 
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of her quarters and into the meadows to make love to Zeus (645-654). Her anxiety about 
these visions is made clear, as she divulges their content to her father who consulted various 
oracles in an attempt to understand their meaning. This provokes questions about the 
reliability and veracity of Io’s visions more generally, as her father seeks help to establish 
their truthfulness and exact meaning. At the oracle’s command, Io’s father casts her out of 
the household, resigning her to her fate of wandering madness. Aeschylus’ telling of the Io 
myth focalises these dream visions as the very instigator of her troubles, particularly 
significant when we consider that her madness is characterised by the visual perceptions of 
her earlier tormentors. This seems all the more significant when we consider that this differs 
from other accounts of how Zeus and Io came first together. In Aeschylus’ Suppliants (290-
296), for instance, Io is described as a key-holder of Hera’s temple and it is here that Zeus 
seduces Io; there is no mention of him communicating with her through dreams. 
The Io episode is nearing its end when Prometheus offers a prophetic account of Io’s 
future (introduced at 705-706). To anyone familiar with the myth, Prometheus’ words would 
be recognised as entirely truthful; Io will travel to Egypt where she will bear Zeus a child 
(848).224 However, in her state of madness Io is unable to understand that Prometheus is 
offering her a true account of what lies ahead. Aeschylus has Prometheus ascribe Io’s failure 
to respond to his mantic account as a result of her suffering (823-824), which has engendered 
a detachment from reality. This scene has obvious echoes of the hallucination scene in the 
Odyssey (20. 345-360), which you will remember meant that the suitors failed to see the 
truth of the prophet Theoclymenus’ vision, as their comprehension was affected by their 
madness.225 
The crescendo of Io’s madness, before her departure from the stage, directly follows 
a state of withdrawal which contrasts with her earlier willingness to communicate with 
Prometheus and the Chorus. It is worth noting that withdrawal and unresponsiveness is a 
prelude to hallucinatory madness in another of Aeschylus’ plays, Agamemnon, which relates 
the prophetic visions of Cassandra (1045-1070).226 Perhaps the most striking portrayal of 
 
224 See also, Aesch. Supp. 313.  
225 The relevant passage is quoted on p. 12 above. 
226 The Chorus’ use of ‘φρενομανής’ here denotes that Cassandra’s visions are achieved in a state of inspired 
madness. Cassandra’s madness grants her accurate visions of the future that only she is able to see, as she 
accesses another layer of temporal reality. However, I believe that it is appropriate to understand her 
prophetic power as a description of a hallucination as there is no immediate perceptible stimulus for her 
visions. Her prophetic powers are described in terms which indicate a visual experience by her words 
‘What is this I see?’ (τί τόδε φαίνεται;), rather than simply an innate god-given knowledge or premonition 
of the future. 
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Io’s madness as a somatic condition comes from Io’s own words just before she exits (881-
886): 
 
My heart kicks at my ribs in fear! 
My eyes are wheeling and rolling! 
I am blown off course by a raging 
Wind of frenzy. My tongue is out of control. 
My words churn and strike at random 
Against waves of foul disaster. 
 
These final words, which express her madness in terms of its violent physical symptoms, are 
sure to have left an impression on the audience. The terminology is clearly influenced by 
medical descriptions of illness. The description of her eyes as ‘wheeling and rolling’, for 
instance, although a common representation of tragic madness, also appear in medical 
observations of madness which include hallucination as a symptom.227  
This analysis has shown that Aeschylus incorporates medical and psychological 
considerations into his presentation of Io’s visions and madness, with the suggestion that her 
visions may have a naturalistic origin. Although we must not forget that overall the main 
explanation for Io’s torment is the gods228 we can see that Aeschylus, by way of some 
meaningful departures from the traditional accounts of Io’s story, succeeds in introducing 
some contemporary and worldly reflections upon the cause and progression of her visions.  
 
3.3 Orestes’ Visions of the Furies 
Perhaps the earliest portrayal of Orestes’ madness and resulting visions on the Athenian 
stage comes to us from Aeschylus’ Oresteia trilogy at the very end of the Choephoroi. In 
this portrayal, having acted upon Apollo’s instruction to kill his mother, we see Orestes 
struggle to come to terms with what he has done. In his final moments of sanity, during a 
speech in which he tries to justify his actions,229 Orestes expresses an understanding that (as 
 
227 Thumiger (2017a: 95). 
228 Aeschylus portrays that they are the cause of Io’s original torment and ultimately it is the influence 
of a god (848-849) that will calm her mind (the physical touch of Zeus). 
229 Cho. (1025-1026), ‘But while I still have my wits (ἔμφρων), I make proclamation to my friends and 
say that it was not without justice that I killed my mother’. See, Harris (2013a: 293) and Garvie (1986: 
338) who also identify these lines as Orestes’ final moments of lucidity.  
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a consequence of his deed) he will soon lose control of his mind (φρένες) and senses.230 This 
sets the scene for his first vision of the Erinyes, which is concurrent with acute feelings of 
fear (Φόβος).231 The intangible nature of the Erinyes is made clear by the Chorus, who believe 
that Orestes’ perceptions are born from his imagination, or else result from his confused state 
(indicated by δόξαι at lines 1051 and again at 1053). Aeschylus makes it plain that Orestes 
interprets his visions as real entities which the Chorus fail to recognise, ‘You don’t see these 
creatures, I do! I’m being driven, driven away! I can’t stay here!’.232 Frustratingly, for this 
enquiry, the matter of whether this represents a hallucination is complicated by the fact that 
Aeschylus confirms the reality of the Erinyes by bringing them onstage as the Chorus in the 
Eumenides, the final part of the trilogy, where they are now recognised by the other 
characters and the audience.233  
A differing account of Orestes’ visions comes from Euripides’ Iphigeneia in Tauris 
where a herdsman relates the story of Orestes madness, as he mistakes cattle for the 
Erinyes and violently attacks them (280-335). This treatment is similar to that of Ajax and 
Heracles who mistake real objects for something else, rather than see something which 
does not exist. It is in Euripides’ Orestes, however, that we find, in my opinion, one of the 
most interesting accounts of his visions in the extant tragedies. By the time that Euripides’ 
is writing the Orestes, the protagonist has already earned his status as the iconic madman 
who sees things around him that others do not.234 In this play his visions of the Erinyes are 
linked to pathological madness, the condition of his eyes and to his feelings of guilt, 
suggesting that his hallucinations could be caused by physical and emotional factors.235  
The play is set six days after the murder of Clytemnestra, during which time Electra 
describes that Orestes has been overcome by madness which is conceptualised as a terrible 
disease (34-45):  
 
Ever since then poor Orestes here, his body wasting away with a cruel disease, has 
taken to his bed, whirled in madness (μανίασιν) by the blood of his mother… During 
 
230 At lines 1022-1024 Orestes, employing the metaphor of a charioteer veering off track announces, 
‘my mind is almost out of control and carrying me along half-powered (φέρουσι γὰρ νικώμενονφρένες 
δύσαρκτοι)’. 
231 Cho. 1024 and 1047. We may draw a parallel here with Io’s state of fear which, as I argued above, 
informs her visions (see, p. 53-56).  
232 Cho. 1061-62. 
233 Foley (2009: 205). 
234 As evidenced by the philosophers’ discussions of hallucination and madness which frequently refer 
to Orestes as their exemplar.  
235 Saïd (2013: 391). 
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this time he has neither swallowed food nor bathed. He lies covered in a blanket, and 
when his body finds relief from his malady (νόσον), he is sane and weeps, while at 
other times he leaps from the bedding and runs about like an unyoked colt. 
 
Similar symptoms are presented throughout the play; he refuses food, foams at the mouth 
and eyes, is unkempt and corpse-like in appearance and he is weakened and made frail by 
his illness.236 These descriptions demonstrate some key similarities with contemporary 
medical descriptions of illness, including those of a psychic nature. However, the most 
persistent observation made throughout the play of Orestes’ appearance involves the 
movement and functioning of his eyes. Almost every character in the play has something to 
say on this matter:  
 
(1) Menelaus comments: ‘How terrible the glance you shoot from parched eyes!’ 
(389). 
(2) Tyndareus observes ‘sickness in his darting glance’ (480). 
(3) Orestes himself claims that in his illness, ‘I cannot see clearly’ (224).  
(4) The chorus note his ‘darting eyes rolling in fear’ (836-7). 
(5) Electra notes a disturbance (ταράσσεται) in his eyes as his hallucinations manifest 
(253-254). 
 
Electra’s observation is of particular significance as it coincides with Orestes’ vision of the 
Erinyes. Electra sees that his madness and the onset of his visions are about to occur, 
indicating that she is familiar with this sign (253-254): 
 
Ah, ah, your eyes are becoming disturbed, brother! How quickly you have fallen into 
madness, though you were just now sane! (οἴμοι, κασίγνητ᾿, ὄμμα σὸν ταράσσεται, 
| ταχὺς δὲ μετέθου λύσσαν, ἄρτι σωφρονῶν).  
 
As I established in my second chapter, the Hippocratic texts also relate madness to 
disturbances in the eyes indicating that Euripides may be drawing upon contemporary 
 
236 See lines 83-84; 223; 228; and 385-387. 
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medical understandings to portray Orestes’ madness.237 Theodorou comments on the use of 
ταράσσεται and its relationship to ταραχή, which is often associated with the φρένες, 
indicating that Euripides means to establish that Orestes’ eyes display some form of inner 
disturbance.238 Furthermore, Theodorou notes how this contrasts with the typical descriptors 
of madness in tragedy that describe ‘rolling eyes’ which we have seen elsewhere. In other 
tragic representations, the eyes are acted upon by the god, and therefore subject to an external 
force. For instance, the rays of Ajax’s eyes are cast astray by Athena, which results in his 
misperception. This departure in Euripides’ seems intended to suggest that Orestes’ madness 
is both corporeal and internal, rather than born from an external force.239 Euripides seems to 
be introducing medical understandings of madness and visual disturbance into his 
characterisation of Orestes. In other words, he seems to be suggesting that Orestes’ madness 
is in part a somatic disease which has caused hallucinations. 
Whether this disturbance in the eyes is simply an indication of his madness or in fact 
the cause of his hallucinations is not clear. It seems significant that the change in his eyes 
(described as an agitation of sorts) leads into his experience of non-veridical visions. The 
resulting visions of the Erinyes appear only to him, evidenced by Electra’s attempts to 
restrain her brother and temper his reactions. She appeals to him to realise that his visions 
are not real, ‘You don’t actually see anything you think you see! (ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν δοκεῖς 
σάφ᾿ εἰδέναι)’ (559). Her words and physical attempts to placate Orestes have no effect; 
Orestes is clearly experiencing a complex hallucination as he jumps out of his sickbed to 
fight the figures he believes are advancing. His perception of the Erinyes (255-276) are both 
tactile and audial, but the visual nature of his experience is stressed. When his madness 
subsides, he explicitly states that this experience is visual as he exclaims (279): ‘After the 
storm waves I once more see calm (ἐκ κυμάτων γὰρ αὖθις αὖ γαλήν᾿ ὁρῶ)’.240  
Other scholars have suggested psychological readings, which contends that Orestes’ 
madness is an acute emotional response to his act of matricide.241 That Euripides chooses to 
present his hallucinations on stage in this play allows us to examine the circumstances that 
lead up to the event, its onset and aftermath. It is significant that our first reference to 
Orestes’ madness in the play is ascribed to ‘the blood of his mother’ (36 and again at 88). 
Indeed, Harris suggests that Orestes’ attack of madness is a response to Electra’s very 
 
237 See Willink (1986: 127) who comments on the use ταράσσεται and notes that the related terms 
ταράσσειω and τάραξις are often found in medical discussions. 
238 Theodorou (1993: 35).  
239 ibid. 
240 Compare the account in Hipp. Int discussed on p. 24 above. 
241 For example, Theodorou (1993: 37); Porter (1993: 298-313); and Dodds (1951: 42) who asserts, ‘it is 
only Euripides [of the tragedians] who psychologise them [the Erinyes] as pangs of conscience.’  
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mention of her.242 Notably, the first word he calls on stage in his madness is ‘Mother’ which 
shows that she is at the forefront of his mind as his madness manifests (255). I would support 
the view that Euripides’ portrayal of Orestes indicates that the deed of killing his mother is 
the cause of his hallucinations. The crucial passage that supports such a reading is his 
conversation with Menelaus, in which he explicitly connects his visions with this traumatic 
event.  
Menelaus enters the stage at line 348 and is shocked at the corpse like figure of 
Orestes who presents himself as a suppliant. Menelaus enquires, ‘What sort of visions 
(φαντασμάτων) cause you this malady (νόσος)?’ to which Orestes responds: 
‘Understanding: the awareness that I have done dreadful things’ and ‘grief’ (396). Therefore,  
his inner turmoil, caused by his decision to kill his own mother to avenge the death of his 
father, is arguably the true cause of his madness and hallucinations.  The Chorus also (831-
835) shift the focus of their understanding from a physical disease (which is emphasised in 
the opening of the play) to Orestes’ deed and resulting guilt, ‘What malady, what tears, what 
pitiful fate is greater in the world | Than to take a mother’s blood upon one’s hand? From 
doing such a deed he has been driven wild with fits of madness.’ In doing so Euripides begins 
to construct Orestes as someone who is plagued by his actions, rather than simply suffering 
from a disease as the other characters have identified thus far. 
This shows a sensitive consideration of the inner workings of his character, and 
undoubtedly incorporates notions of the emotional and psychological impact that trauma can 
have on the individual.  As Saïd explains Menelaus, ‘puts emphasis on the effect of the crime 
on the (ἡ σύνεσις) and emotions (λύπη) of the murderer’ and links Orestes’ madness to a 
mental awareness and not the Erinyes’.243 In this way, Euripides’ presentation need not deny 
the existence of the Erinyes as a divine source of madness, but it seems that the playwright 
may be suggesting that Orestes’ very awareness of these deities as a concept means that, in 
his state of intense guilt, he begins to imagine that they are pursuing him. Unlike Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia, where the Erinyes are established as real divinities which others can see, and which 
express a vengeful intent against Orestes, in this play they are only present as persecutory 
hallucinations in Orestes’ mind. 
Padel, on the other hand, suggests that Orestes’ visions are in fact entirely truthful, 
arguing that Orestes’ status as a kin-murderer means that a realm of perception, unavailable 
to those who have not incurred the wrath of the Erinyes, has been opened up to him.244 If we 
 
242 Harris (2013a: 293). 
243 Saïd (2013: 392-393). 
244 Padel (1992: 181).  
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accept this, it seems that Orestes’ murder of his mother allows him to see these vengeful 
figures. This is in line with the ideas I articulated in my second chapter on philosophical 
sources, where it was considered that certain individuals may exhibit perceptual awareness 
of things that others cannot see, but far from being false, they are in fact being given access 
to a higher truth. However, the fact that Euripides’ chooses to insert other misperceptions, 
and not just those of the Erinyes, makes this reading problematic. For instance, Euripides 
has Orestes mistake Electra for one of the attacking Erinyes. This implies that Orestes is not 
simply having truthful visions of events that no-one else has access to. His understanding of 
reality is also affected by his madness and this cannot be so easily assigned to Orestes’ ability 
to see the Erinyes as a result of his deeds. His visions of the Erinyes, real or otherwise, are 
interlaced with other non-veridical perceptions which cannot be described as accessing a 
higher truth (Electra is not a Fury).  
Overall, Euripides offers his audience the opportunity to interpret  Orestes’ visions 
in a number of different ways: are the Erinyes real entities that only he can see, having 
committed the crime of killing his mother; are they hallucinations that are related to 
pathological illness and madness; or are they purely psychological, a visual manifestation of 
his guilt, borne from his dreadful deed? 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, hallucination in tragedy is almost always a sign of madness, whether god-
given (as a punishment or in the form of  prophesy) or conceptualised as a result of an illness 
or psychological state. We have cases of madness that cause errors in perception such as the 
delusions and mistaken beliefs of Heracles and Ajax, which produce a distorted view of  
reality. We also have examples of misperceptions which we can assign to hallucinatory 
experiences proper. The frequency of hallucination as a symptom of madness in tragedy 
means that we can conclude that visual misperceptions were widely understood as an 
indicator of insanity in Greek culture. In other words, to portray a character experiencing 
hallucinations would immediately signal to the audience that they were experiencing 
madness in some form or another. The tragedians also connect vision with madness in a 
particularly strong way, emphasising the effects of madness on vision and the eyes role in 
its manifestation. 
In the first part of this chapter I outlined some of the reasons why hallucination as a 
symptom of madness may have been taken up so enthusiastically by the tragic playwrights. 
I suggested that hallucinations became a primary symptom because they were an effective 
   
62 
way of communicating madness in a theatrical setting and explaining character’s seemingly 
irrational acts, which were often integral to the plot. I also argued that using hallucination as 
a feature of tragic madness had the advantage of allowing the playwright to externalise the 
internal world and emotions of their characters, which has both descriptive and narrative 
potential. In this sense, we must be cautious in using tragedy as a source for understandings 
of hallucination in antiquity as it may simply have served as a storytelling device. 
Hallucination in tragedy focalises the disastrous consequences that the misperceptions of 
madness can have and are employed to great dramatic effect. The senses clearly cannot 
always be trusted and this often leads to catastrophic errors. 
My selected case studies of Io and Orestes show that the playwrights combined 
naturalistic and divine understandings of madness and hallucinations into their narrative. 
Io’s represents a particularly interesting early figure in terms of the study of hallucination, 
as Aeschylus calls into question whether her madness is instigated by god-sent tormentors, 
or whether her perceptions are created internally as a result of her fear of the gods. The 
visions of Euripides’ Orestes’ also exhibit a tension between hallucinations ascribed to the 
gods and those which are manifested internally. Euripides seems to be advocating an 
interpretation in this play that the Furies may simply be figments of Orestes’ imagination 
which take on a perceptible quality; a projection of his acute feelings of guilt.  
Overall, these examples show that although madness and hallucination continue to 
be portrayed in tragedy as linked to divine interventions the playwrights also offer other 
plausible explanations, clearly informed by naturalistic understandings of madness. Whilst 
a divine aetiology for hallucinations and madness is always present, overall they express a 
pluralist interpretation, which recognise both naturalistic and supernatural causes of the 
phenomenon.  
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to offer an assessment of Classical and Hellenistic ideas 
about hallucination in medical, philosophical and tragic texts. Overall, the texts have shown 
that the inability to distinguish ordinary visual perceptions from hallucinatory experiences 
was viewed as a sign of madness, and therefore a key concern for writers who engaged with 
the topic. Furthermore, the relationship between hallucination and madness is reciprocal; 
hallucinations could be caused by madness (which could affect the cognitive and sensory 
functioning of its subject) and they could also be the cause of madness (for instance, when 
leading to false beliefs based on erroneous perceptions). Although the discourses which 
consider hallucination as a product of madness contain some key similarities, they also 
develop some interesting points of difference, which I believe can be accounted for by the 
writer’s individual influences and intentions in addressing the topic. In this concluding 
section I draw out some of the main intersections and differences and offer some general 
reflections on my findings.   
 
Naturalistic Approaches 
The first pattern which emerges from the discussions of hallucination across the sources is 
the attempt to formulate rational views of the phenomenon, in contrast to earlier ideas which 
had largely ascribed supernatural origins. The medical texts represent the clearest example 
of this as they develop views of madness which reflect their practice of developing 
naturalistic accounts for all matters of human health, based on clinical observations.245 In 
this context, hallucination was observed as a symptom of several different disorders with a 
mental quality, which could affect cognitive and sensory functioning. My examination of 
the Hippocratic sources showed that they believed hallucinations could arise from various 
affections of different body parts, generally ascribed to humoral imbalances. In other words, 
they understood the event in entirely physiological terms.  
The idea that madness could arise from a disease of the body is also reflected in the 
philosophical sources. However, the philosophers also viewed madness as a condition of the 
soul, associated with uncontrolled passions and moral ignorance. Madness of this kind was 
characterised by misperceptions of the world and the inability to discern between veridical 
and non-veridical impressions. This reflected an attempt to establish a distinct approach to 
 
245 As exemplified in Morb. Sacr. which attacks those who view illness in superstitious terms, surely in 
an attempt to establish a position of superiority and establish expertise, see p. 18 above. 
   
64 
madness that advocated philosophical education as the best path to achieve mental well-
being and avoid misperceptions and madness.246 As Temkin asserts, by late antiquity it was 
commonplace to view that, ‘medicine is the philosophy of the body and philosophy the 
medicine of the soul.’247  
An important exception to the naturalistic explanations in philosophy was Plato’s 
view of god-given madness, where madness and the visions that accompany it were accepted 
as a positive phenomenon. This indicates that opinions on hallucination varied depending 
upon the context and conditions surrounding their manifestation from the perspective of 
different theoretical points of view. 
It is worth noting, however, that I found a surprising lack of evidence in the texts I 
examined which recount visions of gods. This is surprising in the sense that anthropological 
studies have suggested that people in societies which exhibit strong religious beliefs are 
more likely to hallucinate divine figures.248 I concede that this may be due to my focus on 
hallucination as a result of madness specifically, and the particular sources I have examined. 
Nonetheless, my conclusions here differ from other scholars who emphasise this aspect of 
hallucination in antiquity.249 Although the ancient Greeks frequently report seeing and 
communicating with gods in waking visions and dreams in other contexts, it seems that this 
was a phenomenon that did not attract the attention of writers who engaged with madness, 
as presumably this was an accepted part of religiosity.250  
We do, of course, have instances of characters seeing and speaking to gods in 
tragedy, but again, not as many as we might expect.251 Whilst hallucinations in the tragic 
texts maintains, to an extent, a divine origin of madness and its symptoms, I suggest that this 
may have been dictated by the conventions of the genre, rather than reflecting the individual 
tragedian’s views on the topic, which instead showed a pluralistic understanding of the 
causes and consequences of madness. Representations of madness in the extant tragedies 
incorporate naturalistic explanations into the staging and descriptions of their character’s 
 
246 For a discussion of philosophy as a form of preventative psychological medicine see Gill (2013). 
247 Temkin (1991: 8). 
248 Surprising in the sense that other scholars have suggested that people in religious cultures are more 
likely to hallucinate divine figures, see p. 10 n. 14 above.  
249 For instance, Guidorizzi (2010: 149); Harris (2013a); and Leuder and Thomas (2000). 
250 For a modern parallel see the DSM V (2013: 88) acknowledges that hallucination can be a normal 
aspect of religious experience. 
251 Hallucinations in tragedy, by and large, do not involve communications with gods but 
misperceptions of the subject’s temporal surroundings. Think for example of Ajax mistaking cattle for 
his enemies, or Heracles seeing his enemies children in place of his own. Of course, Orestes’ visions of 
the Furies may represent contact with the divine, but only if we accept his visions as veridical rather 
than hallucinatory, which is not the view that I advocated.  
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hallucinations, which are clearly influenced by pathological conditions. Furthermore, in the 
case studies I analysed, the playwrights showed a nuanced awareness of possible 
psychological causes, representing a more humanistic understanding. The tragedies of the 
classical period used hallucination as a motif of madness and exploited it as a dramatic 
device in formulating and communicating the psychology of their characters, with the 
content of their hallucinations reflecting inner anxieties and turmoil. 
 
Hallucination as a Sensory Event 
Another common theme which emerges is that hallucination was understood as sensory in 
nature, which is interesting when we consider the fact that it is now generally recognised 
that, ‘biologically speaking, dreams and visual hallucinations are not, in point of fact, 
exclusively – perhaps not even primarily – a visual experience.’252 I proposed that the 
philosophers’ ideas about visual perception are absolutely central to their understanding of 
how hallucinations might occur, evidenced by their explanations which incorporated the 
mechanics of vision. This included the idea that misperceptions could arise if the process of 
vision was interrupted or circumvented in some way, or the qualities of a perceptible object 
were received by the body in a way that was contrary to the norm. That the overall view of 
the Classical and Hellenistic schools was that the soul was the centre of perceptual 
recognition, and that madness was an affection of the soul, no doubt led them towards this 
conclusion. Overall, the philosophical sources view hallucination as a sensory event, with 
madness disrupting the cognitive processes that would otherwise be able to discern true 
impressions from false impressions. 
I believe that the philosophers marked interest in the topic can be explained by the 
problem that hallucination posed for an epistemic view of the senses, as they sought to 
understand the phenomenon in a way which did not undermine vision as a source of 
knowledge. As a result, they develop perhaps the most technically refined theory for 
hallucination that we met in the sources. The concept of phantasia, presented as a faculty of 
the soul distinguished from thinking and judgement, offered a solution to how the 
phenomenon of dreaming and hallucination may occur. Phantasia and the resulting 
phantasmata involved the perception of residual, or former, sensations which could reside 
in the body and later be recognised (or sensed) by the soul. This could produce visions of 
objects and scenes which were no longer congruent with the subject’s spatial and temporal 
surroundings. In was in this way that the philosophers accounted for the visuals of dreams, 
 
252 Thumiger (2017a: 295). 
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which were often discussed together with hallucinations in medical and philosophical 
contexts. 
The Hippocratic writers also considered misperceptions in relation to the physiology 
of sight, adopting a view that clearly reflects their preoccupation with the body’s fluids; they 
contended that if the ‘purest moisture’ which makes vision possible is contaminated, non-
veridical images may arise. It stands to reason that madness’ associations with morbid 
humours in the medical discourses makes this a possible scenario. Furthermore, they also 
connect madness with the ‘visions of night and day’ and highlight that the images in dreams 
are more vivid in patients who exhibit madness. 
Even in tragedy, where we may not expect an interest in the technicalities of vision, 
we find evidence that connects hallucination to the eyes’ functioning. My discussion 
emphasised the tragedians’ view that madness often had its genesis in the eyes, most notably 
in Electra’s acknowledgement of an obvious alteration in Orestes’ eyes directly before his 
hallucination of the Furies, indicating a disturbance to the physical act of vision. There is 
also the example of Ajax, whose misperceptions occur when the ‘rays’ of his eyes are cast 
astray by Athena, which represents an extramissionist approach to vision and pre-dates even 
Plato’s account. It is entirely possible that audiences of tragedy would also accept 
hallucination as a sensory experience, although this of course remains indeterminable.  
In summary, these similarities show a shared interest in the processes of vision 
amongst the writers, which are utilised and reworked to explain why errors in perception, or 
mistakes in recognising true from false sensations, may transpire in cases of madness.  
 
Emotional Considerations 
Another common feature of the discussion of hallucination is the mention of intense 
emotion, most notably, fear. The medical writers frequently observe fear in their patients, 
who also show symptoms of madness and experience hallucination. However, whether fear 
is viewed as a condition which may induce hallucination or the emotional response to the 
experience itself, is often ambiguous in this context.  
The philosophers too, recognised intense emotion as a contributor to madness, 
suggesting that they also had a certain awareness of the psychological aspects of mental 
states. The philosophers believed that extreme emotions could affect the condition of the 
body, producing madness and also causing people to think that the images of phantasia, 
which resemble sense impressions, were real.  
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It is in the tragic texts, above all, that we find evidence of an understanding of the 
fear and disorientation that hallucinations may elicit.253 Aeschylus makes fear a defining 
feature of Io’s madness and hallucinations, suggesting that her visions are connected to her 
psychological suffering and linked to the fact that visions (in the form of her dreams) were 
the origin of her torment. The tragic texts reflect upon the implication of madness and 
hallucination for the individual, which although surely influenced by the need to effect the 
tragic downfall of their characters, also acknowledge the distress that a detachment from 
reality may engender. In this way, the tragedians demonstrate a nuanced awareness of the 
personal experience of madness through their character’s hallucinatory experiences, which 
is largely absent from the medical and philosophical texts. 
 
Hallucination and Hyperactivity 
This leads me to my final reflection; the sources all seem in agreement that hallucination 
result from madness of a manic, rather than depressive nature. Although I recognise that 
madness in these periods was not strictly classified, hallucination appears to be connected to 
a form of madness linked to excess emotion and energy. For example, the Hippocratic On 
Regimen that I discussed developed an idea that certain people are naturally predisposed to 
hyperactivity and madness, receive sensations more rapidly than others and make quick 
judgements which can result in hallucinations. The terminology used to describe instances 
of madness, which feature hallucination as a symptom, also lead towards this conclusion. 
Some of the descriptions we met included: ‘whirling’, ‘leaping’, ‘jumping’, ‘grinning 
laughter’, ‘raging’, ‘fighting’ and ‘frenzy’, all suggestive of a loss of control and energy. 
Furthermore, the transition from withdrawal and unresponsiveness (depressive states) to 
hyperactivity and kinetic energy, often accompanies the onset of hallucination in tragedy.254 
We can imagine that even Plato’s conception of divine madness, which involves possession 
and states of ecstasy, implies a sense of energy and excitement.  
 
Final Remarks 
To conclude, this study has shown that the medical, philosophical and tragic sources of the 
Classical and Hellenistic period provide a rich resource for the study of hallucination in 
 
253 However, the Hippocratic reference to suicide in Virg. Morb., discussed on p. 23 above, may be an 
empathetic consideration on the writer’s part. 
254 Orestes’ is described a leaping and jumping from his bed when he experiences his hallucination, in 
contrast to his earlier subdued disposition. 
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antiquity, which I believe could benefit from further research. For instance, it could prove 
interesting to examine how ideas about the phenomenon will develop in later periods; we 
have already seen how the concept of phantasia, which was so central to the Hellenistic 
philosophers’ understanding of hallucination, had transformed by the first-century AD.255 
Furthermore, I believe that extending the study of hallucination beyond the visual sphere to 
examine how the ancient Greeks accounted for misperceptions in relation to the other 
sensory faculties could also add to this discussion.  
I have demonstrated that using a wide variety of literary evidence, can be particularly 
rewarding in developing an overall understanding of complex and somewhat elusive 
phenomena, such as hallucination. In light of this I would recommend this methodology for 
further research into the subject, which would contribute to the ongoing discussions of 
hallucinations across disciplines, in the context of mental health and wellbeing, an area that 
continues to evade a complete understanding.  
 
  
 
255 Long. On the Sublime, 15.1-2. 
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